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ABSTRACT
This thesis historically examines CIO union organizers 
in the Ely, Nevada copper district from 1941 to 1943, when 
three International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers 
(Mine-Mill) affiliates won National Labor Relations Board 
certification elections. Through their educational function 
of mobilizing working-class support for the union and of 
filtering the international union's progressive program to 
its locals, the Mine-Mill organizers fulfilled Antonio 
Gramsci's concept of the "organic intellectual." Although 
conditions favorable for unionization were apparent by the 
mid-1930s, Mine-Mill was initially frustrated as the union's 
left-wing and moderate leaders clashed over tactics, 
allowing several AFL craft unions to gain a foothold in the 
district. Mine-Mill's ultimate victory in 1943 ended the 
informal mediation of industrial relations that had 
developed after 1919 when employers instituted antiunion 
strategies such as welfare capitalism and the open shop.
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PREFACE
Between 1941 and 1943 the International Union of Mine, 
Mill and Smelter Workers (Mine-Mill) dispatched several 
organizers to the Ely, Nevada copper district to revive the 
union's floundering locals. Their primary task was to 
recruit enough workers away from American Federation of 
Labor (AFL) locals to attain either outright recognition 
from the district's two primary employers, Nevada 
Consolidated, a Kennecott Copper subsidiary, and the 
Consolidated Coppermines Corporation, or to win 
certification through a National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) election. Although their campaign initially met 
frustration, by October 1943 Mine-Mill-affiliated locals 
were the bargaining agents for most of the area's copper 
workers.
American labor historians have not fully explored the 
establishment of industrial unions by copperworkers in the 
Intermountain West during the early 1940s. Although there 
are several studies of Mexican-American workers in New 
Mexico and Arizona, the region's other states have been 
largely ignored. Nevada historian Russell Elliott, an Ely- 
area native, has written extensively on the district's 
unions prior to 1920, but has only briefly and inaccurately
viii
covered the Depression and World War II years. Elliott's 
sentimental accounts of the district's employers and his 
anti-CIO bias obscure a complex process that led to the 
establishment of legally-sanctioned and employer-recognized 
locals.1
Better models are offered by Mario Garcia's work on El 
Paso smelterworkers and Jack Cargill's study of a New 
Mexican zinc mining community during their famous 1950-52 
Salt of the Earth strike. Both of these historians employ a 
wide array of sources to critically examine their respective 
subjects. Following Garcia's and Cargill's lead, I use 
union archives, primarily the correspondence of union 
organizers, federal and state government records, oral 
interviews, and secondary sources to analyze the 
construction of the Cold War capital-labor accord as a 
historically contingent process conditioned by the attitudes 
and expectations of the participants. This approach allows 
a clearer view into the complex consciousness of workers 
immediately before and during World War II.2
Examining mid-twentieth century labor relations and 
social conditions at both the national and local level tests 
several pertinent questions: What effect did the defense-era 
and World War II prosperity have on the copper industry and 
its company towns? What accounted for the success or 
failure of unionism during this period? What was the role 
of the wartime state apparatus— specifically the NLRB— in
determining the formation of unions? How are the 
contrasting assumptions of both the organizers and the 
workers modified as industrial unionism comes to a company 
town? Finally, what specific problems did CIO union 
organizers face in western company towns and copper camps?
This study is presented as a social history of the 
union organizer. Hired from the membership or through a 
network that funneled working-class activists to union 
officers, the organizer served as a conduit, filtering the 
international union's organizational program to the locals. 
At the community level, organizers confronted the sometimes 
conflicting desires of workers whose consciousness was 
shaped by immediate concerns of job and family security. I 
examine the organizer's role by adapting Antonio Gramsci's 
notion of the "organic intellectual.11 When convincing 
workers to join a union, organizers gave shape to the power 
inherent in mass organization. This was accomplished by 
either prying workers' loyalty away from the company or by 
providing a vehicle for worker resistance. The union 
organizer thus serves as a historical agent with the 
political function of consolidating working-class interests 
into an institutional form.
In the Ely district, paternalism and unionism co­
existed in an informal system of mediating worker grievances 
while protecting company profits and control over 
production. Kennecott's Nevada Consolidated, the state's
x
largest industrial enterprise, stifled unionism through its 
strategy of welfare capitalism at its company towns of 
McGill and Ruth. Consolidated Coppermines, operating an 
underground mine at Kimberly, maintained an open shop 
through intimidation and by paying relatively high wages to 
its more transient miners. Despite these tactics, a 
minority of workers, particularly those in the skilled 
crafts, maintained both AFL- and CIO-affiliated locals, 
without negotiating collective bargaining agreements until 
the early 1940s. During this period, Mine-Mill locals 
throughout the West mirrored the international union, which 
experienced its greatest membership gains.
As the dominant union in nonferrous metal mining, Mine- 
Mill benefitted from growing working-class militancy 
beginning in the mid-1930s. As recently as 1933, Mine-Mill 
languished as the dormant remnant of the militant Western 
Federation of Miners (WFM). Revitalized by New Deal pro­
labor legislation and affiliation with the CIO, Mine-Mill 
challenged both AFL craft unions and open-shop employers 
nationwide. Not only did the union begin to organize the 
numerous copper, zinc, and lead mines in the West and 
Midwest, but by the end of World War II it had extended its 
reach as far south as Alabama's iron-ore fields and as far 
east as Connecticut's brass refineries. Mine-Mill's leaders 
combined an aggressive organizing strategy with a left-wing 
democratic philosophy that attracted black and ethnic
workers, as well as many other industrial workers long 
ignored by the AFL. Despite its growth, critics charged 
that Mine-Mill was a "Communist dominated" union. The 
union's expansion engendered internal dissension from right- 
wing members and external attacks from government officials 
and capitalist employers. Evidence indicates that red­
baiting stemmed more from power struggles among union 
officers and their conflicts over the direction of the 
union's future, rather than simply ideological differences.
Historians of Mine-Mill agree that the union was 
strengthened by government guarantees of union security from 
1937 to 1945.3 They recognize the benefits industrial
unions derived from the 1942 "maintenance of membership" 
formula that automatically enrolled new workers in unions. 
Despite the CIO's impressive growth, some labor historians 
have criticized its wartime alliance with the government, 
and specifically the Democratic party. In Labor's War at 
Home. Nelson Lichtenstein shows the postwar costs of the 
CIO's support for Franklin Roosevelt's war mobilization 
plan. Lichtenstein concludes that labor's accommodation 
with the state was a "Faustian bargain" that led to a 
conservative and bureaucratic labor movement which 
suppressed labor militancy during the Cold War.4
Because he limited his study to only four, albeit 
major, CIO unions, Lichtenstein ignored both the nonferrous 
metals industry and the so-called "left-led" unions. Mine-
Mill, a fragile union in a geographically diverse and
oligopolistic industry, owed its institutional life to
successful NLRB certification elections. An examination of
Mine-Mill at the local level shows that its wartime reliance
on the state labor mechanism was a strategic move that
finally forced recalcitrant employers to bargain with
democratically-elected unions.
My focus on Mine-Mill places this study under the
rubric of "union-centered" or "neo-institutional" labor
history.5 This method recognizes, as Howard Kimeldorf
asserts, that unions are
not only economically-based interest groups but 
potential vehicles of social change, whose social 
importance lay in providing the principal means 
through which wage earners, one of the two great 
classes created by the industrial revolution, 
constituted themselves as an organized force 
capable of influencing the direction of modern 
society.6
The labor union, through its ability to mobilize, 
shape, and articulate class desires and grievances, is 
nothing less than the potential or actual locus of working- 
class power against capitalist hegemony. This does not deny 
union conservatism or class collaborationism; nor does it 
neglect the racist, sexist, and provincial aspects of the 
American working class. However, when fused with workers' 
own moral and ethical sensibilities, the labor union wields 
a collective power that directly contrasts with the free- 
market notion of libertarian individualism that isolates the 
wage worker as an economic commodity and a mere consumer of
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production. Recent debates, harkening back to the origins 
of American labor history, have affirmed the efficacy of 
this type of historical analysis.7
David Brody has urged that scholars once again place 
"institutions and power relations at the center of labor 
history."8 The study of trade unions and their goal of 
collective bargaining was the focus of the "old" Wisconsin 
school of labor history, led by economists John Commons and 
Selig Perlman, after the turn of the twentieth century. As 
the first attempt at an interpretative framework, the 
Commons-Perlman thesis located the character of the American 
working class in its conservative, "jobs-conscious" trade 
unions.9
Beginning in the 1960s, the "new" social and labor 
historians reacted against what they saw as the Wisconsin 
school's narrow conceptualization of the working class, 
particularly the exclusion of the vast majority of the 
nonunion labor force, including women, blacks, and ethnic 
immigrants.10 They used both class and culture to analyze 
worker behavior, asserting that it was not accommodation, 
but resistance to capitalism based on premodern workplace 
customs and community morals, that best characterized 
American workers.11
The exclusion of labor unions from American working- 
class history runs the risk, as Jean Monds has argued, of 
"denuding this history of its essential political content."
xiv
Despite the perceived ascendence of culture studies over 
class analysis, the labor union has remained a central 
aspect of working-class history. In the process of 
recovering a vast range of previously ignored subjects, many 
historians never abandoned the study of labor unions. 
Instead, they have applied more sophisticated techniques and 
varied theoretical frameworks to examine them at the 
community and national level. The best of these studies 
acknowledge the labor union's "centrality to working-class 
mobilization and social change."12
In the following chapters I examine the Ely-area Mine- 
Mill locals during a critical transformation in class 
relations. To be sure, the Ely district of the 1930s and 
1940s contained a diverse social milieu. The existence of 
two large capitalist enterprises determined, for the most 
part, the area's social formation. In the segmented labor 
force of western company towns and copper camps, Anglo- 
American skilled craftsmen held the few high-wage jobs. 
Unskilled whites, blacks, and first- and second-generation 
European, Asian, and Mexican immigrants occupied the large 
number of lower-paid positions as semiskilled operatives and 
laborers. Some women worked for wages in secretarial and 
service occupations, but most were relegated to domestic 
non-wage labor as housewives and mothers until 1943, when a 
labor shortage forced the company to hire them as industrial 
workers. White, male workers were union members and claimed
xv
an economically privileged position in the hierarchy of the 
working-class community. That women and nonwhite workers 
influenced this process is certainly undeniable and demands 
further study.
This study contributes to our heretofore limited 
knowledge of Nevada's twentieth-century working-class 
history. In 1994, as some of the state's largest employers 
seek a return to open-shop welfare capitalism, it must be 
remembered that workers in the past successfully opposed 
these antilabor practices through the organization of labor 
unions. This is critical in the coming years when workers 
need to know that their desire for security, dignity, and a 
decent life is linked to a tradition of resistance to 
capitalist exploitation and degradation.
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CHAPTER 1
THE POLITICS OF ORGANIZATION: THE INTERNATIONAL UNION 
OF MINE, MILL AND SMELTER WORKERS, 1892-1940
Few American labor unions can match the radical, 
discordant, and sometimes tragic history of the 
International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers and 
its predecessor, the Western Federation of Miners (WFM). 
Formed as an institutional response to capitalist mining, 
the WFM was the predominant working-class force in the West 
during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. 
Sundered by ideological dissension, the WFM shifted from 
syndicalism to conservatism during its volatile two-decade 
existence. Its legacy of promise and despair lingered long 
in the memories of Western miners and labor militants. 
Vernon Jensen aptly described the WFM as "the paragon of 
democratic, industrial unionism, the pride of many 
Socialists, the scorn of the leaders of the AFL until 
affiliation was belatedly worked out, the founder of the 
IWW..., and the valiant defender of the rights of unionism 
in many struggles throughout the West...."1
Unionism had existed in the mining West since the 
1860s. Local unions in Nevada, Montana, and Colorado had
1
2some success in dictating wage and hour rates around the 
region's mines and mills until the 1880s. As mining 
operations grew increasingly larger, employers began 
organizing in opposition to workers' control, using both the 
state and Pinkerton detectives to break strikes aimed at 
opposing wage reductions.
First conceived in 1892 during a class war between 
striking miners and employers at Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, the 
WFM was formally established a year later when forty 
delegates met at Butte, Montana to form a regional 
federation of existing local unions.2 Its constitution 
outlined the WFM's original goals: union recognition and the 
closed shop, a fair wage ("just compensation for our 
labor"), arbitration and conciliation to resolve industrial 
disputes, and improved health and safety laws. They sought 
to eliminate employers' private armies, the use Pinkerton of 
detectives, convict and child labor, and payment in scrip.3
The document also provided for the appointment of 
organizers "to organize all nonunion miners." Richard 
Lingenfelter notes that the WFM clearly recognized that 
haphazard organization in the past had undermined incipient 
unionism. As a result, only a quarter of the region's 
30,000 miners belonged to unions. Lingenfelter credits WFM 
organizers for the union's substantial membership growth and 
economic power over the next decade.4
The WFM briefly affiliated with the AFL from 1896 until
31898, when members grew increasingly frustrated with the 
AFL's dilatory bargaining tactics and lack of financial 
support for their strikes. Members also opposed the AFL's 
policy of craft unionism that organized workers into 
autonomous locals by their respective trades. Increasing 
technologies in the metal mining industry created a 
heterogeneous workforce consisting of miners, craftsmen, 
semiskilled operatives, and unskilled laborers. WFM members 
believed that craft unionism blunted class-consciousness by 
separating workers by trade and that only through industrial 
unionism— one union for an entire industry— could workers 
recognize their common interest.5
Once free from the AFL's class collaborationism, the 
WFM spearheaded the formation of anticapitalist alternative 
federations that culminated in 1905 with the syndicalist 
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Both organizations 
originally defended the concept of local autonomy within a 
democratic and decentralized organizational structure, 
eschewed time contracts, and advocated the use of strikes to 
achieve workers' demands. In 1907 the WFM reached its peak 
as the IWW's metal mining division, claiming 40,000 members 
in nearly 200 locals.6
The WFM was increasingly split between radicals who 
advocated syndicalist unionism and socialist politics and 
moderates who favored "pure and simple" economic goals. 
Moderates, especially those living in established
communities, increasingly rejected the IWW's emphasis on the 
class struggle for more accommodationist tactics, in 1908, 
the WFM separated from the IWW as the first step towards 
reconciliation with the AFL, which it rejoined in 1911 with 
jurisdiction over all workers in the nonferrous metals 
industry.7
Encountering increased employer opposition that 
reflected a national open-shop movement, the WFM's 
membership steadily declined after disastrous strikes 
decimated several important locals. At its annual 
convention in 1916, the union was renamed the International 
Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, ostensibly to 
recognize its jurisdiction now extended beyond the West.
The name change can also be viewed as a semantic effort to 
distance the union from its radical past.8
Following World War I, Mine-Mill's decline continued as 
conservative leaders failed to revive the moribund union. 
After the resignation of long-time president Charles Moyer 
in 1926, organizational disarray was apparent: conventions 
were held irregularly and sparsely attended, and almost all 
international officers and board members doubled as working 
miners and smeltermen. An international organization in 
name only, Mine-Mill languished through the first years of 
the Great Depression, paralleling the devastated economic 
fortunes of the metals industry.9
Like many other unions in the 1930s, Mine-Mill
5benefitted from the breakdown of "New Era" economics that 
paved the way for a restructuring of American industrial 
relations. In 1933 the union was a mere remnant of the WFM 
with only six active locals and 1500 members.10 Over the 
next decade Mine-Mill recovered, aided at the national level 
by three developments: New Deal labor legislation, the rise 
of CIO and industrial unionism, and the return of prosperity 
to the metals industry created by defense-era and then 
wartime demand.
Mine-Mill, along with much of the American organized 
labor movement, directly benefitted from New Deal labor 
legislation that, for the first time, gave government 
sanction to unionism. The National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA), enacted in June 1933, reinvigorated organized labor. 
In its most famous passage, the NIRA's Section 7(a) affirmed 
the right of workers in America's industrial sector to 
organize and bargain collectively through elected union 
representatives. Although the provision proved impossible 
to enforce and was, along with the rest of the NIRA, 
ultimately struck down as unconstitutional, it spurred 
organization not only among the established craft unions, 
but also among industrial workers long-ignored by the 
AFL.11
Following the demise of the NIRA, union growth was 
again stimulated by the passage of the Wagner Act in July 
1935, particularly after the Supreme Court affirmed its
6constitutionality two years later. The Wagner Act gave 
further impetus to the rising industrial union movement by 
upholding the principle of majority rule, initially 
mandating that employers bargain exclusively with one 
democratically-elected union. It also strengthened the 
National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) power to hold 
certification elections, force employers to negotiate, and 
curb many anti-union practices.12
The NLRB's increased power to compel union recognition 
directly aided Mine-Mill's growth. This was evident at many 
Southwestern copper mines where employer intimidation had 
long stifled unionism. Claiming that it was "the answer to 
the workers' problems," a Mine-Mill organizer working in New 
Mexico in 1930s recounted that the Wagner Act "was the first 
time that we had some semblance of government 
protection."13 After 1933, workers throughout the 
nonferrous metals industry began forming their own locals, 
constituting a growing membership that soon surpassed the 
international union's organizational capabilities.
In June 1933, delegates from Mine-Mill's remaining 
locals promised an aggressive drive to take advantage of 
this spontaneous organization. This campaign was led by a 
diverse combination of old AFL craft unionists, former WFM 
and IWW members, and, what Jensen termed "a new crop of 
radicals reaching to the Communist fringe."14 The next 
year, the union experienced a tenfold expansion, claiming
715,000 members in ninety-four locals. By 1935 membership 
increased to 26,000 in 132 locals.15 A year later, Thomas 
Brown, the union's president, was expelled. His exit 
signaled a new era for Mine-Mill, one that would witness the 
resurfacing of an ideological split similar to the division 
that had devastated the WFM.
At the center of this controversy was Reid Robinson.
In 1936, Robinson, just twenty-eight years old, was elected 
Mine-Mill president. The son of a Butte Mine-Mill officer 
who had migrated throughout the western United States and 
Canada, Robinson had witnessed the General Strike of 1919 as 
a Seattle newsboy. When his family returned to Butte in 
1921, he briefly worked in the copper mines before entering 
local union office in the early 1930s for the Butte Miners' 
Local No. 1, Mine-Mill's strongest local. Robinson served 
as a convention delegate and, owing to his immense 
rhetorical skills and aggressive floor style, quickly rose 
to the head of the union. Although initially part of a 
conservative coalition, Robinson gradually advanced a left- 
wing, progressive agenda that alienated his former 
supporters.16
Robinson followed Brown's 1935 decision to align Mine- 
Mill with United Mine Workers (UMW) president, John L. 
Lewis's insurgent Committee for Industrial Organization 
(CIO) that split the AFL and the entire American labor 
movement between craft and industrial unionism. Mine-Mill
8leaders repeatedly encountered jurisdictional disputes with 
AFL machinists and other craft unions. Particularly odious 
were the AFL's "back door" agreements— secret contracts 
between craft unions and employers prior to NLRB elections—  
that excluded the large number of semiskilled operatives and 
laborers employed in the metals industry.17 In 1938, Mine- 
Mill, for the second time in its history, left the AFL when 
the federation expelled the eight CIO unions.18
Although hardly a dominant union in the CIO, claiming 
just three percent of its membership, Mine-Mill was, as 
Vernon Jensen remarked, "in the company of a thriving 
industrial union movement."19 However, Jensen's 
observation assumes that the CIO unions, and specifically 
Mine-Mill, had the institutional capability to take full 
advantage of their independence. Unlike the United 
Automobile Workers, for example, Mine-Mill clearly lacked a 
base of well-placed rank-and-file activists and organizers 
in key locals.20
Despite affiliation with the newly-christened 
Congress of Industrial Organizations, Mine-Mill's growth 
slowed as the initial heady effect of the Wagner Act 
evaporated in the face of open-shop employers' organized 
opposition to the New Deal.21 The 1937-38 "Roosevelt 
recession" further slowed the revival of metals industry 
unionism, as Mine-Mill attracted a paltry 800 new 
members.22 The AFL's Metal Trades Department also launched
its own organizational push that helped regain some of the 
support it had lost to the industrial unions.23 Once 
again, Mine-Mill's expansion sputtered.
Mine-Mill's cycle of growth and stagnation reflected 
its failure to place organizers in communities where 
employers used welfare capitalism or open-shop tactics to 
quell incipient unionism. In such company towns and mining 
camps, organizers were needed either to recruit skeptical 
workers or to instruct militant workers how to circumvent 
employer opposition, apply for a union charter, and then 
petition for an NLRB election. Despite ambitious rhetoric 
during the late 1930s, union officers lacked adequate 
operating expenses to hire a sufficient number of 
organizers.
What organizational thrust existed was supplied by the 
members themselves. Chase Powers, who later became a Mine- 
Mill organizer and Board Member, recalled that "there were 
no organizers," when he and other Oakland, California tunnel 
workers applied for a charter in 1934. Mine-Mill "was too 
weak," Powers added, "so we organized ourselves.1,24 Vern 
Curtis, a Bisbee, Arizona copper miner who became a Board 
Member in the 1960s, remembers that until 1937 "we never had 
any help at all." Nor did Mine-Mill have the money to begin 
an adequate campaign. Curtis noted it was "a broke union" 
that "didn't have the operating expenses and money to assign 
people to assist [us]."25
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After affiliation with the CIO, Robinson took action to 
correct Mine-Mill's organizational deficiencies. Powers, 
hired as an international representative in 1936, saw a 
"natural chain of circumstances" shaping this decision. He 
claimed that Robinson, raised among conservative Butte 
unionists, was radicalized by CIO leaders like Lewis, Harry 
Bridges, head of the powerful International Longshoremen's 
and Warehousemen's Union, and the United Electrical Workers' 
Albert Fitzgerald. Taking his cue from these militant 
leaders, Robinson "reflected this association and knowledge 
back in his [own] union."26
Robinson discovered that strategically-placed activists 
in the field and the front office could overcome Mine-Mill's 
lack of financial resources. He duplicated Lewis's use of 
Communist and left-wing organizers with the Steelworkers 
Organizing Committee (SWOC) 27 Unable to obtain a 
sufficient operating budget, Robinson had to find people 
willing to work for little pay. Experienced, left-wing 
organizers, dedicated to promoting organized labor, fit the 
bill. Again emulating other CIO leaders, Robinson 
established organizing projects independent of the union's 
Executive Board, assigning the newly-hired organizers to 
build locals at Connecticut brass refineries, Southwestern 
copper districts, Idaho silver mines, and eastern Canadian 
gold fields. Assembling a staff to handle the increased 
activity, Robinson hired a research director, a publicity
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director, and named his own editor of the Mine-Mill edition 
of the CIO News. Powers recalled that during this period 
Mine-Mill "learned the techniques of organizing" other CIO 
leaders had used so effectively.28
Robinson's bold action elicited protests from moderate 
Mine-Mill officials. In Mine-Mill's hierarchy, Board 
Members from the union's seven districts held votes on the 
Executive Board. As president, Robinson did not possess a 
vote and, if faced with a hostile Board, had to gain consent 
for his policies through rank-and-file support. By 1940, a 
majority of Board Members increasingly objected to 
Robinson's organizational tactics, which they perceived as a 
threat to their power.
Board Members initially tolerated, but soon came to 
resent the new left-wing organizers when it became clear 
that new members were loyal to Robinson. As Powers 
remembered, "all the left-wing militant guys...did the 
organizing" in districts that lacked competent rank-and-file 
organizers. New members "didn't know who [their Board 
Member] was....They didn't know anybody but these [left- 
wing] organizers and Reid Robinson...." When Board Members 
started losing the support of the members in their 
districts, "the friction began" between them and 
Robinson.29
By 1940, Robinson's organizational strategy exacerbated 
ideological differences that echoed the dissensions of the
12
WFM era. Realizing that the Depression and subsequent New 
Deal labor legislation had created a more militant worker 
who demanded union representation, left-wing members 
complained that moderate leaders underestimated the rank- 
and-file's desire for immediate organization. Because Mine- 
Mill needed additional organizers to take full advantage of 
this new militancy, provincial Board Members opposed to the 
hiring of outside organizers stifled the union's growth. 
Moderates further obstructed expansion by defeating a dues 
increase necessary to build an effective organizational 
staff.30
Moderates, usually holdovers from the 1920s, responded 
by red-baiting Robinson, claiming that the Communist Party 
had taken control of the union. They defended opposition to 
his policies by invoking the union's tradition of local 
autonomy and democratic unionism and linking those practices 
to the glory days of the WFM and the IWW.31 Missing from 
the moderate's critique were two crucial points. First, 
those days were long gone. Changes in both the structure of 
the metals industry and the national political economy 
necessitated centralized organization. Second, the WFM had 
failed, doomed by its own internal ideological differences 
and weak regional structure.
Dedicated to organizing the entire nonferrous metals 
industry along industrial lines, Robinson, in fact, never 
advocated jettisoning Mine-Mill's impressive democratic
13
credentials, established through the use of the referendum, 
convention resolutions, as well as rank-and-file election of 
officers and ratification of contracts. He did realize that 
without a strong, national organizational structure the 
union was both anachronistic and institutionally unstable. 
Unlike the union's moderate members, Robinson understood the 
CIO's main mission from the late 1930s through the 1940s: 
"organize the unorganized.11
Improving economic conditions soon set the stage for a 
ambitious organizational campaign. Defense-era and then 
World War II demand for all metals, but especially copper, 
shifted labor market forces to the union's side, 
particularly in the Intermountain West.32 The extensive 
use of copper in war materiel, mainly in the manufacture of 
cartridge casings, ignited an industry-wide boom. Beginning 
in 1939, copper production rose rapidly until domestic 
consumption reached record levels by 1943.33
Although copper producers complained that legislation 
froze many prices during the war while excess profits taxes 
diminished the accumulation of large cash reserves, the 
industry was once again financially stable. Their primary 
problem was an acute labor shortage that prevented the 
maximum production required to reap the full rewards of 
guaranteed government demand. A need for workers curtailed 
management's usual methods of resisting unionism and allowed 
Mine-Mill a unique opportunity to gain a foothold in areas
14
that had long proved difficult to organize.34
With prosperity's return to the nonferrous metals 
industry, Mine-Mill embarked on an organizational drive 
aimed at the nation's top metal producers. Its primary 
target was the one hundred thousand workers employed by the 
"Big Five" copper companies— Anaconda, American Smelting and 
Refining, American Metals, Phelps Dodge, and, based 
primarily in the Southwest, Kennecott.35 This important 
campaign did not, however, diminish Mine-Mill's internal 
dissension. During their attempt to organize Western 
copperworkers, its leaders continued to debate the politics 
of organization.
As Nelson Lichtenstein has shown, labor's rise in the 
1930s was an "unfinished struggle." For Mine-Mill and the 
other CIO unions, the New Deal did not mean that mass 
organization was a fait accompli. Instead, they confronted 
an array of problems: employer opposition, internal 
divisions and financial difficulties, NLRB policies that 
increasingly worked against industrial unionism, and 
apathetic and resistant workers split along ethnic lines.
An examination of one Intermountain West community 
highlights the difficulties that Mine-Mill encountered 
during its sometimes frustrating campaign to organize the 
nation's copper industry.36
15
NOTES
1. Vernon Jensen, Nonferrous Metals Industry Unionism. 1932- 
1954: A Story of Leadership Controversy (Ithaca, 1954), 5.
2. For the history of the WFM and early Mine-Mill see Vernon 
Jensen, Heritage of Conflict: Labor Relations in the 
Nonferrous Metals Industry u p  to 1930 (Ithaca, 1950); for 
western miners and unionization see Richard E. Lingenfelter, 
The Hardrock Miners: A History of the Mining Labor Movement 
in the American West, 1863-1893 (Berkeley, 1974); for the 
social history of western miners see Ronald C. Brown, Hard- 
Rock Miners: The Intermountain West. 1860-1920 (College 
Station, 1979); Mark Wyman's Hard Rock Epic: Western Miners 
and the Industrial Revolution. 1860-1910 (Berkeley, 1979) 
argues that changing technology fostered unionism among 
miners. Sources of the miners' radicalism are found in 
Melvyn Dubofsky, "The Origins of Western Working-Class 
Radicalism, 1890-1905," Labor History 7 (Spring 1966), 131- 
154; Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial 
Workers of the World (Chicago, 1969), 19-56. Conservatism 
among Irish miners is the subject of David M. Emmons' The 
Butte Irish: Class and Ethnicity in an American Mining Town. 
1875-1925 (Urbana, 1989). Other works on western mining 
unionism based on secondary sources are Mike Solski and John 
Smaller, Mine Mill: The History of the International Union 
of Mine. Mill and Smelter Workers in Canada— Since 1895 
(Ottawa, 1985); George H. Hildebrand and Garth L. Mangum, 
Capital and Labor in American Copper. 1845-1990: Linkages 
Between Product and Labor Markets (Cambridge, 1992), 117- 
147; see also Bob Greene's essay "Western Federation of 
Miners/Mine Mill, and Smelter Workers," in Mary Jo Buhle, 
Paul Buhle, and Dan Georgakas, eds., Encyclopedia of the 
American Left (Urbana, 1992), 821-823.
3. Lingenfelter, ibid.. 221-22; Hildebrand and Mangum, 
ibid.. 121.
4. Lingenfelter, ibid.. 223. "Proceedings of the First 
Annual Convention of the Western Federation of Miners, Held 
at Butte, Montana, May 15-19, 1893," quoted in Lingenfelter, 
ibid.
5. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict. 63; Hildebrand and Mangum, 
ibid.. 22; Dubofsky, "The Origins of Western Working-Class 
Radicalism," passim.
16
6. Jensen, ibid.. 160-235; Hildebrand and Mangum, ibid. 121- 
127; Dubofsky, We Shall Be All. 57-87. The WFM established 
the Western Labor Union in 1898, the American Labor Union in 
1902 before founding the IWW. Membership figures in Jensen, 
Nonferrous Metals Industry Unionism. 5.
7. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict. 236-255; Jensen, Nonferrous 
Metals Industry Unionism. 2-4; Hildebrand and Mangum, ibid.. 
123-129.
8. Solski and Smaller, ibid.. 14. The nonferrous metals 
consist copper, zinc, lead, iron, silver, gold, magnesium, 
molybdenum, manganese, titanium, and uranium. Mine-Mill 
also organized potash miners and tunnel workers. It claimed 
jurisdiction over all miners and production workers working 
the nonferrous metals industry, including brass workers in 
copper refining plants.
9. Solski and Smaller, ibid.. 14.
10. Official Proceedings of the Thirty-first Convention of 
the International Union of Mine. Mill and Smelter Workers. 
1934, 8.
11. For an overview of Depression-era labor history and the 
NIRA see Irving Bernstein, Turbulent Years: A History of the 
American Worker. 1933-1941 (Boston, 1970), 172-216, passim.; 
James R. Green, World of the Worker; Labor in Twentieth- 
Centurv America (New York, 1980), 133-173; Robert H. Zieger, 
American Workers. American Unions. 1920-1985 (Baltimore, 
1986), 10-61.
12. Bernstein, ibid. 318-351; Green, ibid. 150-151; Zieger, 
ibid.. 38-39. E. David Cronon's Labor and the New Deal 
(Chicago, 1963) is a brief, but helpful source that contains 
excerpts from both the NIRA and Wagner Act, and includes the 
original debates surrounding both laws.
13. Oral Interview of Vern Curtis by Greg Giebel, October 
11, 1969, Historical Collections and Labor Archives, Pattee 
Library, Pennsylvania State University (hereafter HCLA-PSU), 
6.
14. Jensen, Nonferrous Metals Unionism. 6.
15. Official Proceedings of the Thirty-first Convention of 
the International Union of Mine. Mill and Smelter Workers. 
1934, 8. Mine-Mill also added three women's auxiliaries, 
and three statewide councils. Solski and Smaller, ibid..
15.
17
16. Gary M. Fink, ed. Biographical Dictionary of American 
Labor (2d ed., Westport, 1984). 488-89.
17. Irving Bernstein, Turbulent Years. 106-109. Bernstein 
claims there was unanimous agreement against the AFL. He 
describes the Butte Anaconda 1934 four-month strike by 6000 
Mine Mill workers and 600 craft workers organized into 31 
different trade unions over union recognition, wages, and a 
grievance procedure. During the strike, the head of the AFL 
Metal Trades Department, John Frey, negotiated a secret 
agreement in Washington, D.C. for the craftworkers with 
Anaconda's management and government officials. Frey, who 
personally went to Butte, managed to convince twenty of the 
craft locals to ratify the agreement. Mine-Mill members, 
who argued that a plantwide vote would have rejected the 
contract, eventually approved a similar deal. Although it 
was a substantial improvement over existing conditions and 
established the union with one of the nation's largest 
copper producers, Mine-Mill members saw the settlement as a 
"bitter defeat because the crafts had dictated its 
terms....The tail had wagged the unhappy dog." When 
promoting the CIO and industrial unionism, Lewis repeatedly 
"use[d] the Anaconda agreement as a battle cry in the 
developing struggle for industrial unionism." (quotes, 109.)
18. Jensen, ibid.. 21-29; Solski and Smaller, ibid.. 15.
19. Jensen, ibid.. 28-29.
20. Ronald Edsforth, Class Conflict and Cultural Consensus; 
The Making of a Mass consumer Society in Flint. Michigan 
(New Brunswick, 1987), 146-7, 168-170.
21. An example of violent opposition to Mine-Mill is found 
in David Beesley's "Communists and Vigilantes in the 
Northern Mines," California History 64 (1985), 142-151. 
Beesley describes the violent 1938 suppression of Mine-Mill 
organizational activity among California gold miners by a 
combination of mine owners and vigilantes. Managers of 
Kennecott Copper Corporation subsidiaries described their 
opposition to Mine-Mill in Congressional hearings 
considering amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 
see, for example, the statements of David D. Moffat, vice 
president and general manager of Utah Copper and Horace 
Moses, general manager of Nevada Consolidated Copper in 
Hearings before the Committee on Education and Labor United 
States Senate. Seventy-sixth Congress. 1263-1281. For Mine- 
Mill members' recollections of employer opposition, see 
interview of Curtis, December 11, 1969; 5-6, 10-11; 
interview of Chase Powers by Ronald Filippelli, December 12, 
1969, HCLA-PSU, 13. See also Huntley, ibid.. 135-136.
18
22. Leo Troy, Trade Union Membership. 1897-1962. National 
Bureau of Economic Research (New York, 1965), A-26.
23. Hildebrand and Mangum, ibid.. 144-5.
24. Interview of Chase Powers by Ronald Filippelli, December 
12, 1969, 4.
25. Interview of Curtis, December 11, 1969, 7.
26. Interview of Powers, December 12, 1969, 18-20.
27. Max Gordon, "The Communists and the Drive to Organize 
Steel, 1936," Labor History 23 (1982), 254-265.
28. Ibid.; Jensen, ibid.. 52-55.
29. Ibid.
30. Jensen, ibid.. 54; Interview of Orville Larson by Alice 
M. Hoffman and Greg Giebel, December 9, 1969, HCLA-PSU, 11; 
Interview of Curtis, ibid.. 11-13; Interview of Powers, 
ibid.. 18-19.
31. Interview with Larson, ibid..
32. Although consensus is rare among historians of the 
American West, there is clear agreement on the impact of 
World War II. Reaping a disproportionate amount of 
government spending, the West rebounded from the Great 
Depression by the early 1940s. Like their counterparts in 
urban and agricultural West, capitalists in the region's 
extractive metal industry directly benefitted from the 
military Keynesianism required by the defense buildup.
Gerald D. Nash, World War II and the West: Reshaping the 
Economy (Lincoln, 1990), passim.: Richard White, "It's Your 
Misfortune and None of Mv Own": A New History of the 
American West (Norman, 1991), 496-533; Michael P. Malone and 
Richard W. Etulain, The American West: A Twentieth Century 
History (Lincoln, 1989), 107-119.
33. Thomas R. Navin, Copper Minina and Management (Tucson, 
1978), 401; Domestic copper production by primary producers 
reached its highest level in 1943 with 2181.6 million tons. 
Domestic consumption similarly increased from 1534 million 
tons in 1938 to an all-time peak of 5176 million tons in 
1943.
34. Ibid.. 140.
35. Jensen, ibid.. 48.
19
36. Lichtenstein, Labor's War at Home. 8-25, describes the 
CIO's "institutional insecurity" on the eve of the war as it 
struggled with organizing America's basic industry.
CHAPTER TWO
"WELL CONSTRUCTED HOUSES" AND "WELL-KEPT STREETS":
THE ELY DISTRICT, 1902-1929
I.
Organizing the Western copperworkers was a crucial link 
to Mine-Mill's strategy of representing all the nation's 
copperworkers and a prerequisite for establishing postwar 
industry-wide bargaining. An integral part of Kennecott's 
holdings, the Ely district stood on the northwestern point 
of a copper rectangle encompassing the company's other mines 
and smelters in Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona.1
Located in the Great Basin of east-central Nevada, the 
Ely district was the home of Kennecott's Nevada Consolidated 
Copper Corporation. Their economic supremacy of the area 
was symbolized by the massive smelterworks at McGill, a 
company town of 3,000 people, thirteen miles north of Ely, 
the White Pine County seat. This plant processed ore 
shipped by rail from the company's own open-pit mine at 
Ruth, and from Consolidated Coppermines's Kimberly 
underground mines, both twenty-two miles to the southwest.
As the state's largest industrial enterprise, Nevada 
Consolidated dominated economic life in the Ely district,
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employing over one thousand workers at the mines and 
smelter. Consolidated Coppermines, about one-third 
Kennecott's size, employed an additional 500 hundred 
workers.2
Despite the electrical industry's heavy demand for the 
highly-conductive and durable metal since the 1880s, large- 
scale production of Ely district copper deposits did not 
begin until after the turn of the century.3 Mining the 
low-grade (less than two percent of the surrounding rock) 
copper deposits— called "western porphyries"— was not 
profitable until Daniel Jackling applied the open-pit 
techniques used in Minnesota iron mining to Bingham Canyon, 
Utah in 1905.4 Because it is found in minute particles 
spread throughout a large area, porphyry copper must be 
mined in huge quantities to be cost effective. In what he 
described as "mass production mining," Jackling took 
advantage of economies of scale by doubling the amount of 
ore sent through the smelting process. Although his 
original processing methods were primitive, improved 
reduction techniques allowed for higher recovery rates, 
making open-pit copper mining even more profitable by the 
1920s.5
Because open-pit mining was such a massive undertaking, 
an equally enormous initial capital investment was required 
for heavy machinery, a nearby smelting plant to lower 
shipping costs, and a railroad to quickly move the ore
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through the production process. This immense cost meant 
that corporate capitalists, usually Easterners who possessed 
access to large capital markets, controlled the production 
of western porphyry copper. The Ely district was no 
exception.6
Five years prior to Jackling's innovation, miners began 
small-scale development of the porphyry copper deposits 
found in mountains west of the town of Ely. Subsequent 
development followed a familiar frontier pattern; small-time 
speculators first staked out claims which they then sold to 
regional entrepreneurs, who, in turn, were bought out by 
corporate capitalists.7
The Ely district had been the site of gold and silver 
mining until 1900. In 1903, Mark Requa, the son of a 
wealthy Nevada miner and railroad owner, formed what would 
become the Nevada Consolidated Copper Company. He combined 
several of his own claims with other properties he purchased 
from two California miners, who three years earlier had 
first realized the potential wealth in the district's vast 
copper reserves. The same year that Requa appeared on the 
scene, the Giroux Consolidated Company began a separate 
mining operation at nearby Pilot Knob, later known as 
Kimberly. By September 1906, Requa had completed the Nevada 
Northern railroad, connecting Ely with the Southern Pacific 
trunk line 140 miles to the north. Despite his ambitious 
moves, he lacked sufficient capital to efficiently exploit
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the district's western porphyries.
Eastern capitalists, who had increasingly financed 
Requa's expansion, entered the district in late 1905. The 
Cumberland-Ely Company, controlled by the Guggenheim 
brothers, the principal backers of Jackling's Utah ventures, 
began buying shares of Nevada Consolidated stock and 
acquiring selected property, including the vital water 
rights essential for a large smelter works. Next, the 
Cumberland-Ely combined with Requa to finance a 10,000-ton 
smelter and reduction works at McGill. In 1905 the 
Guggenheims finally ousted Requa from Nevada Consolidated 
when they acquired a majority of the company's stock. Their 
initial development phase ended when the railroad reached 
the expanding open-pit mine at Ruth. By 1908, both the mine 
and smelter were operating at peak capacity. Thereafter, 
copper production became the central economic concern of all 
but a handful of the district's residents for the next 
three-quarters of a century.8
A corporate structure soon emerged. In 1910, Jackling 
augmented his copper operations in Utah, New Mexico and 
Arizona, with the acquisition of a half-interest in Nevada 
Consolidated. Jackling continued to manage the operation 
even after the Guggenheims' Kennecott Copper Corporation 
began absorbing Nevada Consolidated in 1915, acquiring full 
control in 1933. At Kimberly, the Giroux properties merged 
with several adjoining claims to form the Consolidated
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Coppermines. Although an independent operation,
Consolidated Coppermines paid a fee to have its ore refined 
at Nevada Consolidated's McGill smelter.9
Beginning in 1908, the district's economic fortunes 
reflected the rise and fall of Nevada Consolidated's balance 
sheet. During the first decade of production, rising prices 
spurred a boom in the copper industry that continued through 
World War I, when profits soared aided by government price 
supports. Once the war ended, the copper market sagged amid 
a worldwide economic slump as overproduction and sluggish 
demand sent the industry reeling. Ely-area production even 
ceased for a brief period during the early 1920s. The 
industry rebounded by 1925, and prosperity continued through 
the end of the decade, when Kennecott's corporate profits 
peaked at over $50 million.10
II.
Militant unionism and periodic strikes had erupted in 
Ely district from 1902 to 1919. Labor unions preceded 
Requa's entrance into the district. A 1903 labor dispute at 
the New York and Nevada Copper Company had ended violently 
when the company's general manager murdered three union 
miners.11 In 1908, the same year Nevada Consolidated began 
operation, the WFM issued charters to the McGill 
smelterworkers and the Lane City miners' union, which 
included the miners at Ruth and Kimberly. Both locals
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opposed the importation of "new" immigrant laborers, brought 
into the district by the Guggenheim-Jackling interests to 
fill the numerous unskilled jobs created by open-pit mining. 
Although native-born and immigrant workers occasionally 
united to protest common grievances, the district's workers 
were often divided along ethic and skill lines.12
The copperworkers also organized in opposition to the 
corporate capitalists. In 1909, as smelterworkers and 
miners struck to protest wage cuts, WFM members built a 
labor headquarters just outside McGill, on what one 
organizer called "the small portion of this planet that does 
not belong to the Guggenheims.1,13 Radical unionism entered 
the district at this time when the IWW established a 
headquarters near Ruth, at Riepetown. Indicating their 
growing class-consciousness, workers also formed political 
organizations, including a labor party and Socialist local 
in 1911.14
Labor militancy exposed management's penchant for 
violence. In 1912, a central council of all the district's 
workers, in a rare display of unity, voted to support a WFM- 
sanctioned walkout at Jackling's Bingham copper pit. They 
added their own grievances, demanding a wage increase and 
union recognition. A general strike followed on October 14. 
Nevada Consolidated hired strikebreakers and armed guards to 
intimidate WFM picketers. On the strike's fourth day, 
company police murdered two striking Greek immigrants.
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Nevada Governor Tasker Oddie then broke the strike by 
ordering the state police into the district to help the 
company resume operations. Nevada Consolidated stonewalled 
the governor's feeble attempt to mediate the conflict, 
although the company ultimately granted a twenty-five cent 
raise. However, it refused to recognize the union or to 
rehire workers who were active in the strike, a policy 
Jackling dispassionately defended as "good judgement.1,15
Sharing none of the copper industry's sizable wartime 
profits, labor remained militant through World War I16 as 
rising living costs led to increased dissatisfaction.17 
During the war, armed soldiers guarded the Nevada 
Consolidated properties "simply to keep agitators out" of 
the district, and deputies searched incoming trains for 
suspected labor organizers.18 These measures did not quell 
worker militancy. Citing the need for a wage adjustment, 
Nevada Northern railroad workers twice walked off their 
jobs. The most radical response to wartime conditions 
occurred at Kimberly in September 1918. Fifty IWW miners, 
demanding "better sanitary conditions, better lights, [and 
a] more liberal food allowance," vowed not to return to work 
until "war prisoners"— antiwar activists convicted under the 
Espionage Act— were released from federal penitentiaries.19
After the war, workers pressured Nevada Consolidated to 
make good on a promised wage increase. Beginning in January 
1919, organized workers repeatedly walked off their jobs.
This agitation culminated in July when the McGill 
smelterworkers, demanding an additional $1.25 per day and 
improved medical benefits, called a general strike against 
the advice of Mine-Mill's international leadership. Federal 
and state mediators, including Governor Emmett Boyle, 
negotiated a settlement in late August that included a 
meager seventy-five cents wage increase. To compensate for 
the difference between the workers' original demands and the 
final settlement, the company established a commissary where 
food would be "sold practically at cost" and, to save on 
winter heating costs, lowered the price of coal, which it 
had traditionally sold to the workers. The 1919 strike 
concluded a turbulent era of labor relations. During the 
next decade, militancy diminished as Nevada Consolidated's 
policy of welfare capitalism led organized workers to 
develop new strategies to mediate their grievances.20
III.
The social relations of production that emerged from 
the rationalization of copper mining in the American West 
were based on a patriarchal system of class power. In 
isolated industrial communities, mutual obligations were 
acknowledged by employers and workers through a system of 
paternalism which recognized the interdependency of both 
classes. As Eugene Genovese has shown in his study of 
southern slave society, paternalism is a "particular
28
relationship...of class power" that "[grows] out of the need
to...morally justify a system of exploitation." Managers in
the western copper industry similarly assumed the
patriarchal responsibilities of plantation masters in an
attempt to discipline their workforce and to legitimize
their social domination.21
From the beginning, Nevada Consolidated established a
tradition of paternalism. The company had built homes at
McGill smelter for the company's executives, foremen, and
skilled craftsmen in 1908, the year the plant commenced
operations. Citing an early real-estate boom, Russell
Elliott maintains that the company had originally planned
for workers to house their families away from the smelter
and mines in growing residential areas near Ely. However,
his assessment discounts management's early recognition of
the need to attract a large and dependable workforce to the
geographically-isolated copper district.22
From the outset, the company controlled the development
of the smelter town. By 1910, company control was evident
in the town's appearance. Elliott recalls the
row upon row of well constructed houses, confusingly 
alike...; the rather broad and generally well-kept 
streets; the lack of hotels and the scarcity of saloons 
along the main street; and the fact that there was no 
restricted [red-light] district within the town 
area.23
As increasingly practiced throughout the mining West 
after the turn of the century, paternalism embraced much of 
the community's social and political realm: local government
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was nonexistent, company approval was required to operate a 
business, and hospital,24 water, and sanitation facilities 
were provided by the employer. In McGill, the company even 
helped finance the construction of ethnic churches.25 
Apologists of paternalism mistakenly claim that these 
amenities were "furnished free," but clearly they were 
purchased with profits, which instead of going into workers' 
paychecks were spent by company fiat.
The most glaring example of company domination at 
McGill was the residential segregation by class and 
ethnicity, a spatial reflection of workplace hierarchies. 
Company executives lived in the "charmed circle," an arc of 
stately Victorian homes around a verdant park overlooking 
the town. Skilled white workers and managers lived in 
comfortable homes in "Middle Town," while lower-paid whites 
lived in the "Upper" and "Lower" townsites. Immigrant 
workers, who had arrived from nearby states or directly from 
their native country, were segregated into the demeaningly- 
named "Jap Town," "Greek Town," and "Austrian Town."26 
Defenders of this policy regard it as merely the company's 
formal recognition of the immigrants' "natural desire" to 
live among their fellow countrymen. But this view 
disregards elementary causation— it was the company 
managers, not the workers, who decided the housing 
assignments.27
Segregation was an instrumentalist corporate policy
that resulted in a divided working-class split along ethnic 
lines. Despite Elliott's assertion to the contrary, ethnic 
workers were never integrated into the organized labor 
movement until the mid-1940s. Physically separated from the 
rest of the heterogeneous community, Anglo-American workers 
developed a nativist, self-conscious concept of 
"Americanism" to differentiate themselves from the other 
workers. Anglo-American workers blamed the immigrants for 
lowering the district's standard of living because the 
newcomers did not appreciate the unique gains made by 
organized labor in the American working-class struggle.
This distorted consciousness stood in opposition to the 
inclusivity of industrial unionism that would have united 
all the district's workers across ethnic lines. It remained 
an obstacle Mine-Mill organizers could only partially 
remove.
Company paternalistic practices prior to 1919 proved an 
ineffective method of quelling labor militancy. During the 
next decade, Nevada Consolidated's management, like many 
large firms throughout the country influenced by 
Progressive-Era notions of industrial relations, developed a 
policy of welfare capitalism in an attempt to curb employee 
dissatisfaction and thus destroy radical unionism. This 
strategy expanded the company's paternalistic role into the 
workers' cultural realm by providing services and benefits 
that were not a "necessity of the industry" or essential to
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maintain class domination. Welfare capitalism sought to 
boost employee morale and link the company and workers 
together in a common partnership. Richard Meltzer has 
accurately characterized welfare capitalism as management's 
attempt "to kill union activity with corporate kindness."28
Under general manager J. C. Kinnear's leadership in the 
1920s, welfare capitalism served as Nevada Consolidated's 
hedge against labor agitation. Kinnear, a college-educated 
engineer from Massachusetts, had been a strikebreaker in IWW 
and WFM strikes in Goldfield, Nevada in 1907. Transferred 
to McGill in 1910 after he was hired by Jackling's Utah 
Copper, he impressed Nevada Consolidated's key officers, 
rising to de facto chief of the entire Ely operation in 
1922. Kinnear's management style straddled the line between 
the increasingly anachronistic manager and the emerging 
bureaucrat. His ability to maintain personal relationships 
with his employees endeared him to many McGill residents, 
especially skilled workers who shared his concept of manly 
comportment. However, Kinnear's "primary mission" was "to 
run a financially successful mining and milling operation." 
Diminishing the power of labor unions through welfare 
capitalism was one means of accomplishing this mission.29
Welfare capitalism became entrenched by 1925 after the 
Ely district recovered from the postwar depression and a 
fire that destroyed the smelter. Once the smelter was 
rebuilt, Kinnear earnestly applied this system, aided by
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industry-wide prosperity. Kinnear's son, who also became a 
Kennecott executive, later recalled that workers had 
traditionally "expected a large company to take a 
paternalist (father-son) attitude.1,30 Evidence suggests, 
however, that workers' demands were limited to decent wages 
and safe working conditions.31 Instead, it was the company 
that brought great expectations into the arena of labor 
relations.
All welfare capitalist projects were designed by 
management to steer their employees' allegiance to the 
company through identification with the community. This was 
evident in various community beautification projects and the 
promotion of rivalries between the smelter and mining towns. 
The company reproduced this system generationally by 
guaranteeing employment to the sons of McGill families. In 
Nevada Consolidated's system of welfare capitalism, class 
was subsumed by fealty to the community and, by extension, 
loyalty to the company.32
To some observers, the 1920s represented an era of 
stability in the Ely district. By mid-decade, the services 
provided at the "model" company towns at McGill and Ruth 
effectively circumvented the role of working-class 
institutions.33 Expanding its domination outside the 
workplace, the company limited the local labor supply, 
guaranteed good wages, and sponsored athletic teams, 
fraternal organizations, and other social and recreational
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activities.
This strategy engendered loyalty from many of the 
townspeople— an implicit consent which the company 
maintained across class lines. In her analysis of Lansing, 
Michigan's Reo Motor Car Company, Lisa Fine interprets 
welfare capitalism as an "alliance" between male employers 
and male workers. Under this system, male workers, 
increasingly losing autonomy on the factory floor to a 
combination of Fordism and Taylorism, exchanged this loss of 
job control for participation in the company "family."34 
Fine's analysis helps to explain the social dynamics in 
Nevada Consolidated's company towns.
Although Anglo-American workers stood atop a stratified 
working-class community, all male wage earners were assured 
a privileged place in its social hierarchy. Despite the 
presence of some unmarried male workers, the cornerstone of 
the company town's social structure was the family. By 
providing a living wage and suitable housing, workers 
experienced much of what constituted a middle-class 
lifestyle— their wives did not work, their children attended 
good primary and secondary schools, and they earned enough 
discretionary income to allow for modest consumerism.35
Reo's system differed from Nevada Consolidated's in 
several respects. The auto industry was rapidly deskilling 
its workforce through assembly line technology; in copper, 
traditional skilled workers still remained. The Reo
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workforce was mostly native-born and the company used an 
"Americanization" program to integrate the minority of 
foreign-born workers into the community. At the Ely 
district, there was a sizable foreign-born population, and 
the company encouraged ethnic distinctions. Finally, Reo 
had an explicit open-shop policy, that included firing 
suspected union members. At Ely, skilled Anglo-American 
workers openly claimed membership in craft locals. Despite 
Nevada Consolidated's comprehensive efforts to subvert class 
consciousness, the company did not openly harass or dismiss 
union members. Given these differences, Fine's otherwise 
trenchant model does not fully explain how the Ely 
district's organized workers maintained an informal 
equilibrium somewhere between the open shop and collective 
bargaining.
IV.
Although Nevada Consolidated refused to recognize their 
unions, Anglo-American skilled workers did not disband their 
locals in the 1920s. During a decade of nationwide employer 
antiunionism, Mine-Mill Local 233, tracing its origins back 
to WFM, remained active. Some of its members also belonged 
to the smelter's AFL craft unions, who claimed additional 
supporters among the engineers, switchmen, and skilled 
shopworkers employed by the Nevada Northern railroad.36
Ely-area craftsmen continued to pay union dues and hold
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meetings despite their failure to exercise a labor union's 
most important economic function— described by Harvey 
O'Connor as "hav[ing] the strength to tell the employer what 
he should do in regard to his employees, within the 
limitations imposed by collective bargaining.1,37 Given 
Nevada Consolidated's history of antiunionism and the 
apparent success of its welfare capitalist policy, why did 
skilled workers maintain union locals?
The answer lies in understanding how workers perceived 
unionism at this time— as part of an informal equilibrium 
with an employer who refused to recognize their labor 
unions. The informal equilibrium was a process that allowed 
them to keep their locals and to mediate industrial 
relations without establishing formal collective bargaining 
or resorting to militant action. Balancing the interests of 
labor and capital, this system replaced other means of 
resolving class conflict by the mid-1920s.
At McGill, craftworkers did not forget their recent 
militant past; nor did they embrace Nevada Consolidated's 
welfare capitalism. The earlier strikes had been 
instructive. The 1919 strike had showed they could make 
clear material gains— the establishment of a commissary, for 
example— even though the company refused to recognize their 
union or to fully grant their wage demands. By the 1920s, 
formalized industrial relations was no longer a primary 
goal. Instead, the Ely-area craftworker sought security,
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job safety, and a decent standard of living, characterized 
by a "saving wage" sufficient "to enable him to support 
himself and his family in reasonable comfort, educate his 
children, and save something for his old age."38 As they 
became permanently settled in the community, craftworkers 
devised a method to advance their interests and avoid 
incurring the brunt of employer reaction. This system 
required both their accommodation to company hegemony and 
the assertion of their perception of a labor unions' 
function.
Craftworkers did not discard unionism because they 
continued to view labor unions as the institution that had 
fought and won security and modest prosperity for the 
American working class. Speaking for AFL members at the Ely 
district's 1924 Labor Day celebration, C. E. Handwright 
claimed that "organized labor...is responsible for the high 
standard of living that is enjoyed in the United States."39 
Unions were also the institution that separated native-born 
craftsmen from immigrant industrial workers. An Ely 
newspaper editorial credited the AFL for its opposition to 
"orientalism" and its determination to keep America a "white 
man's country."A0 Unions did not function to overtly 
challenge Nevada Consolidated in the economic realm. But by 
maintaining union locals, craftworkers simultaneously upheld 
their conception of citizenship and class.
Nevada Consolidated had two primary considerations
regarding its workforce. First, it had to maintain a 
sufficient number of skilled workers and laborers in an 
isolated area; and second, because the profit margin in 
copper production was dependent on rapidly moving the ore 
through the smelter, it could not afford to countenance 
worker control of the production process. The company used 
welfare capitalism to assure a stable supply of skilled 
workers and, as Fine shows, to prevent union interference on 
the job. The craftworkers' response— forming unions but not 
formally challenging management prerogatives— was therefore 
an adjustment to the company's policy of welfare capitalism.
The previous two decades had shown that the company 
would resort to raw force or the power of the state to 
prevail during times of industrial conflict. However, after 
the establishment of welfare capitalism, workers kept their 
locals as a threat to extract small concessions out of 
employers who were determined to quell labor conflict even 
if it required paying higher wages or providing better 
living conditions. Active union members viewed industrial 
relations at the smelter as a dynamic balancing act between 
outright rejection of unionism and striking for formal 
recognition.
The Ely-area also offers a unique case study because of 
the contrast between organized smelterworkers and the 
miners, who vacillated between radical unionism and 
accommodation to the open shop. Unionism in the mining
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camps reflected the boom-and-bust cycle of the mining West. 
Unlike the smelterworkers, the miners' unions stressed 
social as well as economic goals, as demonstrated by their 
radical demands in 1918. McGill was WFM and Mine-Mill 
territory, while the mining camps were IWW turf.
Conversely, when the radical impulse was extinguished 
in the 1920s, miners did not even retain the shell of a 
functioning union. At the Kimberly mine, where Consolidated 
Coppermines could not command a stable workforce among the 
transient miners, workers dismantled their locals for a 
system that consisted of relatively high wages and 
geographical mobility. This arrangement allowed them to 
leave the area if they disapproved of their working and 
living conditions. Thus the type of equilibrium carefully 
cultivated among the smelter and railroad workers was 
nonexistent at the mines, where the informal mediation 
process consisted of simply staying or leaving.
Industrial relations broke down quickly when external 
forces affected the informal equilibrium at the mines. If 
worker dissatisfaction with deteriorating living conditions 
coincided with decreased mobility, miners tended to organize 
spontaneously. As miners rapidly shifted from nonexistent 
unionism to militancy, mine employers, who rejected welfare 
capitalism as an option to reestablish equilibrium, resorted 
to repressive antiunion activities— blacklisting, hiring 
labor spies, and employing dictatorial foremen. These
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tactics only served to increase the miners' militancy.
This system would not be toppled until 1943, when Mine- 
Mill joined local members to forge a new regime of 
industrial relations. In the interim, the two different 
informal equilibriums would be severely tested during the 
Great Depression, when New Deal labor legislation sparked 
the Ely-district's copperworkers to seek institutional 
solutions amid deteriorating economic conditions.
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1. Jensen, Nonferrous Metals Industry Unionism. 133-136. in 
1946 the union developed a plan for an "Ideal Collective 
Bargaining Structure" based on area-wide and industry-wide 
units. Jensen is critical of the geographical strategy 
because major producers preferred plant-by-plant bargaining. 
He does, however, view Reid Robinson's company-by-company 
approach as a "logical" step to industry-wide bargaining.
A1 Skinner, head of Mine Mill's postwar Kennecott council, 
defended this strategy on the grounds that large 
corporations must be organized on a national basis for 
collective bargaining to be effective. See First Oral 
Interview of A1 Skinner by Alice Hoffman and Greg Giebel, 
December 9, 1969, HCLA-PSU, 29. During the war, Reid 
Robinson wanted to ensure "the most satisfactory results" in 
the union's "organizational drives at several properties of 
the Kennecott Copper Corporation." Reid Robinson to George 
Haskell, December 10, 1941, in the Archives of the 
International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, 
Western History Collection, University of Colorado 
[hereafter cited as IUMMSW], Box 35, Folder 6, "George 
Haskell."
2. Fifteenth Census of the United States. 1930. Population. 
Vol. 1; Number and Distribution of Inhabitants. Department 
of Commerce, (Washington, D.C., 1931). Consisting of the 
Ruth copper pit, the Nevada Northern railroad, and the 
McGill smelter, Kennecott's Nevada holdings accounted for 
thirteen percent of the parent company's total output from 
1916 to 1941, Navin, Copper Mining and Management. 263. The 
Kimberly figure is based on the number of voters in the May 
1943 NLRB election, Ely Daily Times. May 13, 1943.
3. Navin, ibid.. 13; Hildebrand and Mangum, Capital and 
Labor in American Copper. 94-95. Western copper mining 
developed slowly because of prohibitive costs due to 
inadequate transportation and low-grade deposits. Although 
the telephone was invented in 1876 and Edison patented the 
incandescent lamp in 1880, western miners did not begin 
exploiting known copper reserves until 1881, and heavy 
production did not occur until the 1890s. Iron wire was 
used in the telegraph industry until the western copper 
mines began production. Navin, Ibid.r l3n.
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4. Hildebrand and Mangum, ibid.. 37-41, contains Arthur B. 
Parsons' description of the six characteristics of western 
porphyry copper: (1) "Extensive" deposits that "can be mined 
efficiently only at large scale, through underground block 
caving or open pits"; (2) Uniform distribution of copper 
throughout the ore preventing "selective" mining; (3) The 
ore contains the presences of igneous rock, "either porphyry 
or closely related rocks," indicating these rocks may have 
produced the copper minerals; (4) The "upper layers of 
copper ore have been concentrated by...[a] natural leaching" 
process; (5) "Two factors" affect the "dimensions of the ore 
body": the ore grade declines "with both lateral extension 
and increase of depth," and the cost of extraction and 
market price of the mineral "set the limits of mineable 
ore"; and (6) the presence of "low-grade sulfide...requires 
fine grinding and concentration before smelting."
5. Unlike underground mining where copper veins are 
selectively extracted from the hard rock, in open-pit mining 
steam shovels remove all the surface ore, which is then sent 
to the mill where the copper is separated from the "slag," 
or nonmineral bearing ore. Through a process called 
flotation, minute copper particles are separated from the 
surrounding rock, concentrated at the mill, smelted into 
sheets of "blister" copper, and then sent to refineries in 
the East.
6. Navin gives Jackling's initial investment figure as $7-10 
million, and the entire Bingham operation cost at $25 
million. Navin, Copper Mining and Management. 119n. See 
also Hildebrand and Mangum, ibid.. 83-84; Michael Malone and 
Richard Etulain, The American West: A Twentieth-Century 
History (Lincoln, 1989), 23-26.
7. Although, as Patricia Limerick shows, not the only 
pattern. Western merchants and speculators— "courtroom 
miners"— also acquired large mining interests. See 
Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the 
American West (New York, 1987), 111-114 for a typology of 
the "winning mineowners." Richard White, "It's Your 
Misfortune and None of Mv Own": A New History of the 
American West (Norman, 1991), 265-266, describes the 
consolidation of Western mining.
8. Elliott, Nevada's Twentieth Century Minina Boom. 173-204, 
details the early development of the Ely District; Ira B. 
Joralemon, Romantic Copper: Its Lure and Lore (New York, 
1934), 239-40.
9. Elliott, ibid.. 282-289; Stanley W. Paher, Nevada Ghost 
Towns and Mining Camps (2d ed., Las Vegas, 1984), 236.
Rumors circulated periodically that Consolidated Coppermines
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would build their own smelter. Nevada Consolidated (then 
Kennecott7s Nevada Mines Division) acquired Consolidated 
Coppermines in 1958.
10. Elliott, ibid.. 199-200, 294-295; Paher, ibid.. 231; 
Navin, ibid.. 392.
11. Elliott, ibid.. 251-3. Miners formed the Robinson 
Miners7 Union No. 175, a WFM local, to protest a fifty-cent 
wage reduction, and company violations of the existing 
eight-hour day. The murders effectively terminated the 
short life of the union. This did not, however, "end[] Ely7s 
labor troubles," as copper industry historian Ira Joralemon 
claimed. Joralemon, ibid.. 239.
12. For a description of the Ely district7s labor history
from 1903-1920, see Elliott, ibid.. Chapter 9.
13. Harvey O 7Connor, The Guqgenheims; The Making of an 
American Dvnastv (New York, 1937), 387. In 1909, 
smelterworkers protested a wage cut and the company7s 
failure to abide by the state7s newly-enacted eight-hour 
law. That same year underground miners staged an 
unsuccessful two-year strike that shut down the Veteran mine 
until 1911. Elliott, ibid.. 258-9.
14. Elliott, ibid.. 259.
15. Elliott, ibid.. 263-268; Jensen, Heritage of Conflict.
270. Oddie disallowed two warrants for the arrest of Nevada 
Consolidated officials. Twenty-one guards were charged for 
the murder of the two strikers, but the case was not 
prosecuted because it was impossible to prove which guards 
had done the killing. Elliott, ibid.. 267-8.
16. Alan Derickson, Workers7 Health. Workers7 Democracy 
(Ithaca, 1988), 206-207. Members of Local 233 threatened to 
strike over a company medical examination policy that 
discriminated against older workers and those with 
"insignificant health problems." Derickson quotes one Nevada 
Consolidated worker; "The age limit was placed at 44 years 
and the examination was so severe that one-half to two- 
thirds could not pass it satisfactorily." If there was a 
labor surplus in the district, Nevada Consolidated used this 
policy to "weed...out" the "older men and physically 
incompetent."
17. Elliott, ibid.. 268-9, 295.
18. 07Connor, ibid.. 386-7. Elliott, Nevada7s Twentieth- 
Century Minina Boom. 268-9. Elliott claims that "comparative 
peace" reigned in the Nevada mining areas until World War I,
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Nevada labor organizations during the war." He also claims 
that workers adhered to the wartime "no-strike" pledge, see 
Elliott, Growing Up in a Company Town. 21.
19. "Second Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Labor, 
1917-1918," (Nevada), Appendix to Journals of Senate and 
Assembly. (Carson City, 1919), 90. Railmen struck for a 
wage increase in March 1918. Shopmen in Nevada Northern's 
repair works walked out in July 1918. The trainmen's 
demands inspired McGill workers to demand recognition of 
their wartime "workmen's committees." Nevada Consolidated 
submitted an industrial plan that recognized the committees. 
Twice during the war, the company was cited by the Nevada 
State Labor Commissioner for violation of eight-hour laws.
20. Elliott, ibid.. 269-72. During the two-month strike, 
Nevada Consolidated illegally attempted to stop railroad 
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CHAPTER THREE
CHALLENGING HEGEMONY, 1930-1940 
I.
Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony explains how a 
ruling class gains consensus from subaltern groups, thereby 
extending its domination throughout the whole of society 
without the continual application of brute force. He 
defined hegemony as an "organizational and connective" 
function of the superstructure emanating historically from a 
society's specific economic base through the corresponding 
social relations of production. Refining Karl Marx's theory 
of society, Gramsci posited a superstructure consisting of 
two integrated levels. The first level consists of 
"political society," where the state and legal apparatus 
exercise their familiar roles of force and legal coercion, 
or what Gramsci labelled "direct domination" and "command." 
The second level consists of "civil society," or the 
"private" sector. It is at this level where the ruling 
class organizes hegemony, obtaining "spontaneous consent" 
from the subordinate class.1
Hegemony is maintained through the dominant economic
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groups7 ability to "elaborate," or extend, its economic 
domination into the political, cultural, and social realms 
of the subordinate class. A social class gains consent and 
subsequent social cohesion through the use of intellectuals 
serving as "deputies" to "direct...the ideals and 
aspirations" of the dominant class. Although Gramsci 
posited a theory of the state, hegemony is also organized at 
the local level.2
The character of company domination and the 
construction of the informal equilibrium of industrial 
relations in the Ely district shows a local application of 
hegemony. During the 1912 and 1919 strikes, Nevada 
Consolidated demonstrated its ability to command the state7s 
juridical and police apparatus to forcibly coerce compliance 
with its rule. During the mid-1920s, its policy of welfare 
capitalism supplanted working-class institutions and quelled 
agitation, thus gaining peaceful consent for its control.
"Hegemony," Eugene Genovese says, "implies class 
antagonisms; but it also implies...the ability of a 
particular class to contain those antagonisms on a terrain 
in which its legitimacy is not dangerously questioned."3 
After the 1919 strike, Ely-district workers discarded the 
overt challenges to management prerogatives so evident in 
the preceding two decades. This decision was marked by the 
rejection of inclusive industrial unionism and the 
abandonment of any notion of an oppositional political
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culture. The workers7 capitulation and deference to 
capitalist prerogatives attest to the establishment of 
company hegemony. As a dynamic system of class domination, 
hegemony also required compromises by both companies in 
order to obtain consent from the district's workers.4
Nevada Consolidated recognized the limits of its 
control. It acknowledged the craftworkers7 notion of 
masculinity by granting them a preferred status in the 
community, keeping their wages high, providing good homes, 
and allowing the formation of union locals without 
retaliation. The company also permitted the immigrant 
workers to maintain "ethnic enclaves" without mandating 
intrusive Americanization projects.5
Nevada Consolidated had successfully maneuvered through 
a turbulent two decades of industrial relations to gain the 
workers7 consent of their economic control by extending that 
control further into the cultural sphere of the working- 
class. Nevada Consolidated7s system, described by Elliott 
as "semi-feudal," required micromanagement of the local 
labor market and interference into workers7 cultural 
institutions that was not practiced at the Kimberly mines.
There, the company had opted for the advanced 
capitalist notion of individualism and depersonalization.
The Kimberly miners, in turn, reacted to market forces 
rather than directly challenging Consolidated Coppermines7 
domination. By the end of the 1920s, both companies had
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established hegemony in Ely district, mediated through the 
informal equilibriums at the McGill and Kimberly.
II.
Once the prosperity of the 1920s ended, three 
conditions converged to disrupt the Ely-district's informal 
equilibrium. None of these conditions can be seen as 
sufficient to topple the existing system of industrial 
relations, yet each signified the intrusion of external 
forces that presented both the workers and the company an 
opportunity to maintain the status quo or to opt for change. 
These forces exposed the contradictions inherent in both 
welfare and open-shop capitalism as they increasingly 
conflicted with a federal labor policy that sanctioned 
collective bargaining.
The first threat to the informal equilibrium was 
upheaval in labor market conditions caused by the copper 
industry's plummeting economic fortunes during the Great 
Depression. Welfare capitalism or reliance on market forces 
were useless if they failed to provide for the workers' 
material subsistence. Economic insecurity during the 1930s 
led workers to reject the district's existing systems of 
class domination and move toward collective solutions 
suggested by New Deal labor legislation.
A second necessary condition affecting the district's 
industrial relations was government support for unionism,
51
which stood in opposition to the existing social relations. 
Government sanction was important because it allowed 
unionized workers to simultaneously express citizenship and 
class-consciousness. Defining themselves as both members of 
the working class and as American citizens, workers could 
morally justify collective action when it was backed by the 
government's imprimatur. Unions were now seen as patriotic, 
American institutions. Workers rejected the hegemonic 
notion that equated unionism with radicalism and began 
expanding their locals once they perceived the state as an 
ally that could successfully compel employers to 
collectively bargain.
The final condition that could potentially upset the 
district's informal equilibrium was the international 
union's support of local organizational efforts. To the Ely 
workers this meant the assignment of an organizer to their 
area. The union organizer served the function of what 
Gramsci termed the "organic intellectual,11 helping the 
working-class realize itself as a distinct class by 
providing an explicit critique of ruling-class domination 
and by formulating a working-class alternative to the 
received order. The organizer also possessed the knowledge 
to mount an effective campaign through a systematic, 
educational process.6
The organizer's strategy held immediate and long-term 
goals. The organizer had to convince workers that
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unionization could successfully provide concrete economic 
gains and more control of the job process. This was 
accomplished through an economic and moral critique of 
existing institutions. In addition to this activity, the 
organizer as "organic intellectual" also fulfilled a 
political function by performing the initial task of 
mobilizing the working class against capitalist hegemony.7
The "outside" organizer was crucial in districts where 
this type of intellectual did not emerge from the workers 
themselves. Although there were some rank-and-file leaders 
in the Ely district, their enthusiasm was tempered by 
company intransigence and fluctuated with changing economic 
conditions. In 1941, Mine-Mill belatedly began activity in 
the Ely area as part of their larger strategy of organizing 
the nation's copperworkers. Until then, the Ely-area 
workers were on their own.
III.
The carefully-constructed system of class domination in 
the Ely district was predicated on a stable economic and 
social environment. Faced with increasing economic 
insecurity after 1930, Ely-district workers responded to the 
government's support of organized labor by reviving dormant 
Mine-Mill locals at the smelter and mines. Industrial 
unionism at the smelter threatened the craft locals by 
organizing workers on a company-wide basis. Between 1933
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and 1938, Ely-area workers mounted three unsuccessful 
attempts to replace the prevailing informal equilibrium with 
formal collective bargaining agreements. By 1940, however, 
economic stability had returned to the district, industrial 
unionism had been discarded, and company hegemony was again 
acknowledged.
The Great Depression hit the Ely district in January 
1930. Tumbling copper prices forced Nevada Consolidated to 
lay off nearly 400 employees, many of whom left the district 
to look for job opportunities elsewhere. The future was 
equally bleak for those who remained, as conditions steadily 
deteriorated for the next four years. By October 1931 the 
company had cut wages ten percent and the plant was 
operating at only forty percent capacity. The union locals 
could not withstand the hard times that descended on the 
district. Down to just twenty-three members, Local 233 
disbanded in November.8
Nevada Consolidated tried to soften the economic 
hardship. The company instituted "work-sharing" plans that 
kept more workers on their payroll, extended credit to some 
workers, and encouraged private charities to provide relief 
to the unemployed. However, the company simultaneously 
continued to cut production and to reduce the size of its 
labor force. Workers and their families were devastated, 
holding little hope for recovery until the summer of 1933.9
Franklin Roosevelt's election victory and the ensuing
54
"Hundred Days" of New Deal reform legislation galvanized the 
Ely district. During the summer and fall of 1933, the NIRA 
received widespread approval from both the district's 
merchants and working class. The NIRA's Section 7(a) 
unleashed a spontaneous wave of union formation. Ely- 
district workers, like thousands across the country, 
responded to the NIRA with patriotic fervor. For the first 
time, the federal government seemed to be firmly on labor's 
side.10
Because the Depression had made it clear that the 
companies could no longer guarantee economic security, 
workers rekindled a militant spirit that recalled an earlier 
era. A speaker at the district's 1933 Labor Day celebration 
declared that the NIRA represented the "principles that 
Labor has fought for through years past." Among these were 
"a voice in industry, work for the jobless, and shorter 
hours at a living wage."11
Ely-area workers believed that unionism would be an 
integral part of Roosevelt's recovery plan. "Proceeding 
under the tenets of the NRA," workers at both the Ruth pit 
and the McGill smelter renewed their Mine-Mill charters.
The Ruth miners organized Mine-Mill Local 124 with 383 
members. At McGill, the smelterworkers revived Local 233, 
which rapidly swelled to 500 members within a few months.12 
Although the AFL also organized several locals at the 
smelter, the Mine-Mill locals' large membership figures
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indicate that most workers organized along industrial 
lines.13 This resurgence was accompanied by mass 
demonstrations of class consciousness held outside the 
company's purview. Both locals jointly planned a "huge" 
Labor Day parade and the Ruth miners union announced its 
first annual dance in October.14
Nevada Consolidated's initial response shows that it 
interpreted this revival of unionism within the framework of 
the informal equilibrium. In August 1933 the company 
announced a wage increase for all employees based on a 
sliding scale that linked wages to the prevailing price of 
copper. Although there is no record that employees actually 
received a raise, it provides an instructive example of the 
company's strategy for containing unionism through economic 
incentives. Nevada Consolidated would repeat this tactic 
several times over the next decade whenever union activity 
increased.15
Despite the enthusiasm for the NIRA throughout the 
district, Nevada Consolidated refused to recognize the 
Mine-Mill locals. The company initially stalled collective 
bargaining negotiations until completion of the copper 
industry's National Recovery Administration production code. 
The copper industry's code, an essential part of the 
National Recovery Administration's plan to raise commodity 
prices by allowing producers to voluntarily limit 
production, would not be approved until April 1934.16
Even after the code went into effect, Nevada 
Consolidated continued to delay collective bargaining 
negotiations. In November 1934, Henry J. Meyer, a 
representative of Local 233, complained to the National 
Labor Board, the ineffectual precursor to the NLRB, about 
the company's refusal to sign an agreement.17 The company 
apparently responded to these charges by dismissing Meyer, 
who filed a discriminatory discharge claim in March 1935.18 
Despite such intransigence, Mine-Mill locals at both the 
company's mine and smelter remained active.
Ely-district unionism received another boost with the 
passage of the Wagner Act and the subsequent rise of the 
CIO. Although enacted in July 1935, the full effect of the 
law was not felt in the district until it was upheld by the 
Supreme Court in April 1937. Membership waxed and waned 
from the spring of 1935 to the summer of 1936, averaging 
about 350 members at the smelter and approximately 230 at 
the Ruth mine.19
The CIO's growing power encouraged further unionism 
throughout the district, commencing in the late summer of 
193 6 and cresting in the fall of 1937. Along with the 
increased activity at McGill and Ruth, miners employed by 
Consolidated Coppermines formed Kimberly Local 363 in June 
1937, claiming 313 members by September.20 In the town of 
Ely, workers in occupations traditionally excluded from AFL 
craft representation also turned to the CIO, forming the
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White Pine Central Labor Union under Mine-Mill's 
jurisdiction.21 So strong was the CIO in the district that 
in July, 1937, Sam W. Wolfe, a CIO organizer speaking in 
Boca, California, claimed that Ely copper miners were "100 
per cent" CIO. Although he slightly exaggerated the 
district's CIO membership at that time, Mine-Mill membership 
records indicate that out of approximately 1500 workers, 
almost 800 McGill smelterworkers and 600 miners at Ruth and 
Kimberly had paid their membership dues.22
Despite their impressive numerical strength, the Ely- 
district Mine-Mill locals again failed to obtain a 
collective bargaining agreement. Carl Barber, the head of 
Local 233's grievance committee, testified at a later NLRB 
hearing that the company did informally recognize the union 
during this period. He recalled that between 1933 and 1938 
"numerous grievances were adjusted" between management and 
Mine-Mill officers at both the smelter and the mine. In 
1936, the locals submitted a collective bargaining agreement 
for Nevada Consolidated's approval. Although "some 
discussion" followed, the company refused to negotiate and 
ultimately rejected the proposed contract.23 Nevada 
Consolidated continued to interpret worker demands as a 
function of the informal equilibrium. Instead of 
recognizing the union, the company responded with a wage 
increase and hinted that "the number of days of employment 
each month.. .would be increased."24
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The climax of 1930s CIO unionism in the Ely district 
came in the spring and summer of 1938. That year, the 
national split between the AFL and CIO reached Nevada.
Until this time, there appears to have been a bipartisan 
spirit among the state's AFL and CIO unions. In the Ely 
area, the Mine-Mill locals had remained members of the AFL's 
White Pine County Central Labor Council (WPCLC) and 
continued to pay per capita dues to the state's AFL council. 
The WPCLC recognized Mine-Mill's traditional industrial 
jurisdiction at the smelter and mines, and craftworkers held 
both Mine-Mill and craft membership cards.25 This local 
harmony would be threatened by events at the state and 
national level.
At the May 1938 Nevada State AFL convention, a 
representative for AFL president William Green red-baited 
Nevada CIO officers and rejected any notions of cooperation 
between the two federations. Gene Keefe, president of the 
Nevada AFL, expressing regret over the controversy, blamed 
the conflict on disagreements between international union 
officers. However, acting on Green's orders, the Nevada AFL 
expelled the state's CIO unions.26
Anticipating the split, twenty-five delegates 
representing the state's industrial unions met at Ely a day 
before the AFL convention to discuss plans for a statewide 
CIO council. The meeting was also attended by Utah State 
Senator E. M. Royle, secretary of Mine-Mill District 2 and
George Cole, "a personal representative" of Reid 
Robinson.27 In June 1938, the first convention of the 
CIO's Nevada Industrial Council (NIC) was held at the Ely 
Labor Temple. The NIC included delegates from CIO locals in 
Las Vegas, Silver Peak, Pioche, and Goldfield as well as the 
three Ely-district locals. Indicative of the district's 
statewide CIO leadership, all three of the council's elected 
officers were from the Ely area. Ignoring the national 
dispute between the two federations, the council urged 
cooperation with both the state's AFL craft unions and 
independent railroad brotherhoods.28 Despite such 
optimism, the CIO was already encountering employer 
intransigence at the Kimberly mine.
The Kimberly miners were the first Ely-area local to 
petition for an NLRB election. In June 1937, miners had 
formed Local 363, the first Mine-Mill local ever at the 
Kimberly mines. The local's initial organizational activity 
appears to have been well coordinated. At a special July 
election to select the local's officers, free buses 
transported the miners from Kimberly and Riepetown to the 
Ely Labor Temple.29
Unlike their IWW predecessors, the Kimberly miners did 
not profess radical goals. Local 363 president L. L. Brown 
announced that he wished "to build up an organization that 
the citizens of White Pine county and J. B. Haffner, general 
manager of the Consolidated Coppermines Corporation, would
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be proud of [sic]." He urged harmony among the members and 
"cooperat[ion] in making the union a true and patriotic 
American organization."30 Despite Brown's sanguine 
pronouncements, the local's membership rapidly declined 
after this meeting. This rapid shift from active unionism 
to apathy indicates that the informal equilibrium still 
existed at the mines. However, by June 1938, as economic 
conditions worsened, the Kimberly local rebounded.
In their first step toward possible NLRB certification, 
Local 3 63 members successfully petitioned for an NLRB 
election to determine if the local represented a majority of 
the Kimberly miners.31 By this time, the union clearly 
intended to establish formal collective bargaining as the 
basis for its industrial relations with Consolidated 
Coppermines. A handbill circulated among the miners 
proclaimed that Local 363 "stands for improved working 
conditions and protection of the rights of all workers." 
Reflecting a militancy that was nonexistent the year before, 
the local's 1938 platform demanded a "fair day's pay for a 
fair day's work," an eight-hour day, collar-to-collar, 
holiday, and overtime pay, seniority rights, a five-day 
grievance procedure, and "compensation for disability due to 
industrial diseases." It listed "negotiation, arbitration, 
mediation, and legislation," as the means for attaining its 
program.32
On the same day the NLRB election was announced, both
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companies posted notices suspending production for a minimum 
of thirty days, beginning June 16 and eventually extending 
until August 1. The decision affected "at least 1000 men" 
in the Ely district, although 200 would remain at Kimberly 
and "several hundred" at McGill and Ruth to do "development 
and repair work." The companies insisted the layoff was due 
to oversupply, "constantly shrinking business," and excess 
production.33
Consolidated Coppermines soon reversed its position.
In the midst of the Kimberly miners' NLRB campaign, 
Consolidated Coppermines announced that, unlike Nevada 
Consolidated, it would not suspend operations. 34 Because 
there is no record of the local's support prior to the 
election, it is unclear whether the company's action had any 
effect on the outcome. What is certain is that Mine-Mill 
apparently won the election by the slimmest of margins: one 
vote.35 However, the NLRB, unable to determine the 
validity of four disputed votes, never compelled 
Consolidated Coppermines to recognize this victory.
In July 1938, Nevada Consolidated announced production 
would resume at Ruth and McGill, and "at least 450 men" 
would be rehired on a five-day week basis beginning August 
l.36 This date marked prosperity's return as rising 
production ended the first challenge to company hegemony.37 
Conditions reverted back to the pre-Depression days. At the 
McGill smelter, a small group of craftworkers maintained a
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Mine-Mill local, while union organization severely declined 
at both the Ruth and Kimberly mines. The informal 
equilibrium of the 1920s had returned.
After the Kimberly debacle, local officers believed 
that successful organization could only be accomplished if 
the international union assigned a full-time organizer to 
the district. While economic insecurity and government 
support for unionism proved necessary preconditions for- 
destabilizing the informal equilibrium, an experienced 
international union organizer would also be required to help 
their locals establish formal industrial relations with both 
companies.
In August 1938, at Mine-Mill's annual convention, the 
delegates from Locals 233 and 363, joined by representatives 
of Pioche, Nevada Local 407, submitted a resolution 
imploring the union to aggressively organize their state's 
mining and metals industry. The resolution described 
conditions throughout the state, and particularly in the Ely 
district, where members were "having a hard struggle" 
keeping their Mine-Mill locals active.38
Delegates listed several cases where employers had 
opposed unionization. Kimberly Local 363, whose NLRB case 
had been pending "for some time," had encountered 
"considerable trouble in obtaining recognition." Although 
Local 363 won their election by one vote, Consolidated 
Coppermines "refused to grant...union recognition [or]
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to...negotiate." Similarly, the workers at McGill 233 and
Ruth 124 had "no working agreements."39
The blame rested on the companies. Although the
resolution did not specifically delineate their grievances,
the Nevada delegates charged that the
mining companies in White Pine County, Nevada are 
responsible for a number of things that break up... 
union organization, discourages [sic] the members,
[and] which have all been in violation of the Wagner 
Act and the National Labor Relations Board.40
The solution had to come from the international union.
Although active members were "trying to hold the unions
together," they needed "an outsider with considerable
experience in the labor movement,...who has had experience
in negotiating contracts through the efforts of the Labor
Board" [emphasis mine] to assist Kimberly, Ruth, and McGill
locals. This type of organizer could "really put the locals
in White Pine county, Nevada where they belong and [allow
them to] receive their just dues under the protection of
the" Wagner Act. The delegates requested that George Cole
(who had attended the recent Nevada State CIO convention in
Ely) be assigned to White Pine County, "to bring the
organizations up and assist with the negotiations" pending
in Kimberly, and at other Nevada mines.
The international union did not respond to the Ely
delegates' plea. Instead, the convention chairman referred
their resolution to the union's organization committee for
future consideration.41 Mine-Mill would not assign anyone
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to the Ely district until 1941, by which time the enthusiasm 
of the 1930s had faded and workers were responding to new 
developments in the area's industrial relations.
Three outcomes resulted from turmoil and activity of 
the depression decade. First, Mine-Mill locals had failed 
to establish the primacy of industrial unionism over craft 
unionism, thus allowing the AFL trade unions (which had been 
devastated by the depression) to gain a foothold among the 
craftworkers that they would exploit in the early 1940s. 
Second, the miners at Kimberly, and to some extent Ruth, 
became disillusioned with Mine-Mill because of the 
international's failure to support their organizational 
attempts. The miners remained skeptical toward attempts to 
revive their locals until 1943. Finally, the informal 
equilibrium of the 1920s returned as both companies 
successfully resisted the workers' attempts to establish 
formal collective bargaining.
65
NOTES
1. Antonio Gramsci, "The Formation of the Intellectuals," 
Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds., Selections 
From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (London, 1971), 
12.
2. Gramsci, ibid.; Hoarse and Smith, "Introduction," ibid..
3.
3. Genovese, Roll. Jordan. Roll. 26.
4. Walter L. Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of 
Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory (Berkeley, 
1980), 170; Roger Simon, Gramsci/s Political Thought; An 
Introduction (London, 1982), 21-28. For formation of 
consent see David Abraham, "Constituting Hegemony: The 
Bourgeois Crisis of Weimar Germany," Journal of Modern 
History. 51 (September, 1979), 417-433. For Gramsci's own 
words, see David Forgacs, ed., An Antonio Gramsci Reader: 
Selected Writings. 1917-1935 (New York, 1988), 189-221, 300- 
322.
5. This concept is applied to Irish copperworkers in Butte, 
Montana in David M. Emmons' The Butte Irish. (Urbana, 1989), 
61-93.
6. This interpretation of the role of the union organizer as 
intellectual was first suggested by Jay Coughtry and his 
work with Mine Mill organizers at the Basic Magnesium Plant 
in Henderson, Nevada during World War II (unpublished 
paper). Professor Coughtry also directed me to Tim 
Patterson's "Notes on the Historical Application of Marxist 
Cultural Theory," Science and Society. 39 (Fall 1975), 257- 
291. Patterson applies this notion to American country 
singers prior to the advent of the commercial recording 
industry. See also Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution. 142- 
146. Adamson writes: "In the case of the proletariat under 
capitalism, one would include as organic intellectuals all 
those striving to create a new proletarian culture as well 
as production functionaries in a narrower sense, such as 
shop foremen, machine technicians, and trade union 
economists." I would add union organizers to this list.
7. This was particularly true prior to the "labor-capital" 
accord of the post-World War II era. As Nelson Lichtenstein 
convincingly argues, the postwar "settlement" was not a
66
determined outcome, but was the result of a capitalist 
counteroffensive during and immediately after the war. 
Labor's growing power during the 1930s and 1940s was, above 
all, a political threat to the capitalist class.
Lichtenstein writes: "The economic power wielded by American 
trade unions was by its very nature political power, for the 
New Deal had thoroughly politicized all relations between 
the union movement, the business community, and the state." 
Lichtenstein, "From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: 
Organized Labor and the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the 
Postwar Era," in Gary Gerstle and Steve Fraser, eds., The 
Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order. 1930-1980 (Princeton, 
1989), 122-152, (quote on 124).
8. Elliott, History of Nevada Mines Division. 231-235. By 
1931 production was under thirty percent of capacity and the 
price of copper fell to barely above eight cents per pound 
from a 1929 high of eighteen cents. By the summer of 1932 
the plant operated on a 15-day per month basis, and payroll 
had been cut almost thirty percent from the previous year. 
The company lost over $2 million in 1932. Despite the 
optimism caused by the NRA, the company suffered its worst 
year in 1933, when copper reached its lowest price ever at 
less than five cents per pound. During this period, 
Kennecott acquired full control of Nevada Consolidated, 
completing a process that had begun in 1915.
9. Ibid.. 248-9; Elliott, Growing Up in a Company Town. 138. 
During the Depression, workers and their families had two 
choices: leave the district or stay and try to survive. One 
McGill resident, born in 1927, remembered that his father, a 
railroad worker, moved his family to Idaho. They did not 
return until 1940, when conditions improved. He recalled 
that Nevada Consolidated "curtailed people down so far that 
all the people that were here couldn't make a living. So 
some had to get out so the others could get enough work to 
live. My dad was one of them that had to get out, he was 
one of the young ones." Oral interview of Jay Carson by 
David M. Anderson, July 9, 1993. Another McGill resident, 
whose family remained in the area recalled the stark 
conditions at the smeltertown. He remember that the Red 
Cross and Community League would distribute sacks of flour, 
and rabbits, and "fat dogs," to the starving residents.
Oral interview of Wendell Knighton by David M. Anderson,
July 10, 1993.
10. Elliott, History of Nevada Mines Division. Kennecott 
Copper Corporation. 244-5; Elliott, Growing Up in a Company 
Town. 139. For the positive effects of Depression-era 
national labor legislation see Michael Wallace, Beth A. 
Rubin, and Brian T. Smith, "American Labor Law: Its Impact 
on Working-Class Militancy, 1901-1980," Social Science
67
History 12 (Spring 1988), 1-29. Interpreting labor law as 
"a major vehicle by which the state mediates class conflict 
within a market-dominated capitalist economy," (22) they 
show that prolabor legislation increases militancy 
"directly, through the creation of an atmosphere 
favorable...to strike actions," and "indirectly, by 
strengthening...the organizational capacity (i.e. 
unionization) of workers...." (10). The most noted example 
of labor equating the NRA with patriotism is in Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr.'s The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the 
New Deal (Boston, 1958). 138-140. Schlesinger cites the use 
of patriotic imagery by the UMW in their effort to organize 
coal workers after the passage of the NIRA. UMW organizers 
compared Section 7(a) to the Emancipation Proclamation and 
their handbills read: "The United States Government Has Said 
LABOR MUST ORGANIZE."
11. Elv Daily Times. September 5, 1933.
12. Mine Mill records, which record the number of members
who had paid dues, show Local 124 with 383 members and Local 
233 with 291 at the end of August, 1933, see the "IUMMSW 
Register of Local Unions, 1932-1942" (bound ledger), IUMMSW. 
The day after the wage increase was announced one newspaper
reported that officials of Ruth 124 and McGill 233
"revealed" the organization of Mine-Mill locals at both 
sites and placed membership of Local 124 at "approximately" 
300, and of Local 233 at "approximately" 350. Elv Daily 
Times, August 25, 1933. The Elv Record noted that workers 
had organized the two locals, and claimed "more than 300" 
workers at the mine, "about 400" at the smelter, Elv Record. 
September 1, 1933. Indicative of the rise in unionism, the 
newspaper noted the formation of a new AFL "Federal Labor 
union" in the Ely district whose "membership will be 
recruited from members of other unions and also from persons 
not members of any union." Elv Daily Times. August 30, 1933.
13. The "Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Labor, July 
1932-June, 1934 (Nevada)," Appendix to the Journals of the 
Senate and Assembly (Carson City, 1934) lists unions that 
had reported to the Commission. This report does not 
contain the Mine-Mill locals, but shows the AFL had two 
unions in McGill: the Plumbers Local 611, and the Carpenters 
Local 1572, 32. The next report shows AFL locals for the 
plumbers, boilermakers (no number), and moulders (no number) 
at McGill, and also includes Mine-Mill Locals 233 and 124. 
"Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Labor, July 1934- 
June, 1936 Nevada," ibid. (Carson City, 1936).
14. The Elv Record. October 13, 1933. The "Ruth Miners 
Union" claimed "nearly 1,000" members in the district, a 
figure that probably represented the combined total of the
68
miners and smeltermen.
15. Elv Daily Times. August 24, 1933. There was no record 
that workers ever received this increase. An editorial 
entitled "Copper Operators Optimistic" also noted the 
"already posted notices of wage increases" by Nevada 
Consolidated, and generally looked at the state of the 
industry in the wake of the NRA. The writer did not, 
however, mention the formation of the union locals. Elv 
Daily Times. August 26, 1933.
16. Elliott, History. 239-243.
17. A. M. Rosseter to Henry J. Meyer, December 3, 1934, 
IUMMSW, Box 851, Folder 28, "NLRB Correspondence and 
Decisions, 1934."
18. R. S. Wagenet to Frank W. Ingram, April 30, 1935, ibid..
19. "IUMMSW Register of Local Unions, 1932-1942," bound 
volume, IUMMSW.
20. Ibid. Beginning in July 1936, membership in Local 233 
steadily increased, until October 1937, when membership 
peaked at 801 members. Similarly the Ruth miners' local 
increased from 169 members in July 1936 to 319 members in 
August 1937. At Kimberly, the first Mine Mill local was 
formed June 1937, and claimed 313 members by September 1937.
21. The Elv Record. April 23, 1937. Approximately 20 members 
joined the Ely local of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers. 
Officers were to be elected April 23, 1937 "following the 
regular meeting of the Central Labor union at Merricourt 
hall." This was an industrial union "embodying workers of 
Ely not affiliated with local craft unions." Officers were 
elected and over 30 applications for new members were 
received and would be initiated on May 10, 1937. Plans were 
made for "an intensive membership drive."
22. The Elv Record. July 23, 1937. Although the union was 
not ready to reveal its plans, and most members had not 
revealed their cards publicly, Wolf said that steps would be 
taken to improve working conditions. Perhaps to diminish 
the CIO's radical image, he further asserted Mine-Mill would 
work peacefully to achieve its aims. For membership figures 
see "IUMMSW Register of Local Unions," ibid..
23. "Memorandum on Behalf of Petitioner," submitted by 
Abraham J. Isserman, Attorney for Petitioning Union [Mine- 
Mill], National Labor Relations Board File R-5381.
"Kennecott Copper Corp.. Ruth and McGill. Nev.." Record 
Group 025: National Labor Relations Board, Unfair Labor
69
Practic. Represent. File, National Archives, Washington, 
D.C.. 8-9. During a 1942 NLRB hearing, the Trial Examiner's 
report also noted: "The Smelter Workers commenced its 
organization of the company's employees in 1933 and 
unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a contract with the 
Company in 1936 or 1937." 38 NLRB 1346. 1349n.
24. Elv Daily Times. September 5„ 1936.
25. "Memorandum on Behalf on Petitioner," submitted by 
Abraham J. Isserman, Attorney for Petitioning Union [Mine- 
Mill], National Labor Relations Board File R-5381.
"Kennecott Copper Coro.. Ruth and McGill. Nev.." ibid..
26. Elv Daily Times. May 9, 1938.
27. Elv Daily Times. May 9, 1938. Delegates from Las Vegas, 
Goldfield, Silver Peak, and Pioche locals also attended.
28. Elv Daily Times. June 21, 1938. The officers were Eugene 
Franks, president and Ralph Hoy, secretary-treasurer, from 
Kimberly, and R. Butner, vice-president, from McGill. 
Officers claimed the meeting was "formed as a necessity" 
following the group's ouster from the AFL convention. The 
newspaper report also read: "Leaders said no split was seen 
in the ranks of Nevada labor but the rank and file was urged 
to get together for their own interest...."
29. The Elv Record. July 23, 1937. On the same day, Nevada 
Consolidated and Consolidated Coppermines resolve of a long­
standing property dispute, which resulted in a doubling of 
Nevada Consolidated's production and the additional employment 
of 150 workers.
30. The Elv Record. July 30, 1937.
31. The Elv Record. June 3, 1938. H. E. Knowlton, an NLRB 
representative, conferred with Consolidated Coppermines 
officials and Kimberly union officers. Knowlton indicated 
he would hold an election to see if the union "has the 
majority of employees of the company for the purpose of 
collective bargaining under the" Wagner Act. The company's 
attorney, George Thatcher was also in town.
32. Ely Daily Times. June 11, 1938.
33. The Elv Record. June 3, 1938. Kennecott was also closing 
its operations in New Mexico, Utah, Arizona, Alaska, Montana, 
and Mountain City, Nevada.
34. Elv Daily Times. June 11, 1938.
70
35. Elv Daily Times. June 14, 1938. 340 votes were cast, 
from a total of 367 voters. One vote was declared void, and 
four votes were challenged. The final vote was 168 for the 
union, 167 against.
36. The Elv Record. July 15, 1938.
37. Bertrand Couch and Jay A. Carpenter, "Nevada's Metal and 
Mineral Production, 1859-1940," University of Nevada 
Bulletin. 37 (November 1, 1943), 145.
38. Official Proceedings of the Thirty-fifth Convention of 
the International Union of Mine. Mill and Smelter Workers. 
(Butte, 1938), 128-9.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid. Also requesting Cole were Silver Peak Local 427, 
Goldfield Local 417 and the White Pine Industrial Union Local 
312.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE "POSSIBILITIES" OF ORGANIZATION,
JANUARY 1941-SEPTEMBER 1941
As defense-era demand revived the copper industry, the 
informal equilibrium of the 1920s began to reappear. This 
was acutely evident in the waning unionism among the Ely- 
district workers. Between 1939 and 1941 the Mine-Mill 
locals at the McGill smelter and Ruth mine steadily 
declined, while Kimberly Local 363 disbanded in 1940.1 
Beginning in the spring of 1941, the AFL began an offensive 
that threatened to unsettle the status quo and to undermine 
industrial unionism among the copperworkers. Mine-Mill 
leaders quarreled over the best approach to block the AFL 
and to organize the Ely district along industrial lines.
This debate centered on the selection of an organizer. 
It reveals internal fissures among the union leaders, 
showing how District Board Member Ralph Rasmussen, who 
desired to use his own rank-and-file organizers, opposed 
President Robinson's use of left-wing outsiders. Robinson's 
compromise choice, L. G. Robison, satisfied neither party. 
Although he conducted a brief and failed campaign, Robison's 
techniques give some insight into the intellectual function
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of the labor organizer. Nevertheless, by the fall of 1941, 
the union had squandered an opportunity to organize the 
district.
In the spring of 1941, Nevada Consolidated signed its
first ever collective bargaining agreement with the
company's train engineers and switchmen. Occupying a 
strategic place in the production process, these workers 
operated the train crews that transported ore from the Ruth 
and Kimberly mines to the McGill smelter. On March 27, 1941
the company agreed to a contract covering wages, hours, and
working conditions with the independent Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers Local 593, the engineers' bargaining 
agent.2 A week later, the AFL-affiliated Switchmen's Union 
Local 267 concluded negotiations in Washington, D.C. with a 
similar agreement.3 These two contracts marked a dramatic 
transformation in the Ely district's industrial relations.
By finally breaching Nevada Consolidated's traditional 
intransigence, the trainmen gave the district's other 
workers hope that the company would bargain with the 
remainder of its labor force.
In the wake of the trainmen's contract, Ely district 
Mine-Mill officers and active members sent "urgent requests" 
to District Two Board Member Ralph Rasmussen asking for an 
organizer to help them capitalize on the new enthusiasm in 
the district.4 Based in Utah, District Two included the 
entire southwestern copper industry, encompassing the states
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of Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. In April, 
Rasmussen submitted a report suggesting the Board consider 
"putting someone on in the future" in the Ely district.5 
Later that month, he toured the Ely district to investigate 
the "possibilities" of organization.6
Rasmussen immediately noticed the AFL's aggressive 
drive to obtain contracts for all the company's craft 
workers. He enviously described the AFL as the district's 
"fair-haired boys," because the AFL-affiliated switchmen was 
one of the two unions that had successfully coaxed Nevada 
Consolidated to the bargaining table.7 The AFL boasted a 
strength and appeal that the Mine-Mill locals could not yet 
match. At the smelter, Rasmussen found the AFL to be "well- 
represented" among the electricians, boilermakers, and 
especially the machinists, who he called "the best organized 
of the crafts."8 Given its strength in these three elite 
groups, the AFL initially considered approaching the company 
as a single unit but soon discarded this tactic because it 
lacked a majority of members among the other craftworkers. 
The AFL decided instead to seek separate contracts for each 
group, demanding a dollar per day wage increase.9
Nevada Consolidated adamantly opposed the AFL 
offensive. An AFL representative told Rasmussen that he had 
asked the company for a "front door deal for the machinists" 
but "had been turned down flat." The company dubiously 
insisted that "they preferred to deal with one union for all
their men" and vowed that "every certification would have to 
be won the hard way"— by winning an NLRB election.10 
Rasmussen laid a "50-50 bet" that Nevada Consolidated did 
not want to negotiate with any of the craft groups, 
regardless of the outcome of the elections. However, the 
company was vulnerable to the demands of the skilled 
workers, who were being lured by the high wages being paid 
on the West Coast. Rasmussen speculated that the machinists 
could prevail with their demands "due to the fact that the 
company is losing all their good mechanics to the shipyards 
and other defense projects."11
Rasmussen hoped that advantageous labor market 
conditions would also benefit the Ely district's moribund 
Mine-Mill locals. Despite their officers' enthusiasm, the 
McGill and Ruth locals were comprised of only twenty members 
apiece and were "for all practical purposes out of 
existence.1,12 Following the failed attempts in the 1930s, 
many smelterworkers had deserted the union, convinced that a 
contract was "impossible since they were turned down on 
their proposal some years ago." Remaining members were, 
according to Rasmussen, "willing and ready to go ahead now 
and rebuild these unions," even though their locals had been 
"dead for a long time." Active Mine-Mill members wanted to 
beat the AFL to the bargaining table, although some were 
machinists who also belonged to the AFL craft union and 
stood to gain either way. The Mine-Mill machinists had been
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"double-heading" or holding cards in both unions, but they 
favored industrial unionism and rejected the notion of 
"separate contracts" for the AFL craft unions.13
For their part, local officers took measures designed 
to encourage recruitment. They agreed to reduce their 
reinstatement fee to attract former members and also decided 
to spend all the money in their coffers— $900 at Ruth and 
$400 at McGill— on an organizing drive built around the 
demands of a pay raise (although they had "comparatively 
good wages"), seniority, a dues check-off, and a better 
vacation clause. Rasmussen noted that the cloud of 
pessimism that had pervaded the Mine-Mill locals since the 
late 1930s had lifted; the trainmen's contract had rekindled 
extinguished aspirations of the past and finally 
"stimulate[d] some life and some hopes for organization.1,14
Because of the contracts, however, Rasmussen was 
cautious about immediately challenging the AFL. The AFL had 
"done a lot of work," he noted, while Mine-Mill was "in 
somewhat of an unfavorable predicament." Nevertheless, the 
AFL had several weaknesses. Its strength was concentrated 
in only three of the six craft locals at the smelter and 
therefore could not match Mine-Mill's potential appeal to a 
broader base of workers.15 Additionally, the AFL was 
suspicious of the NLRB and what it saw as the Board's pro- 
CIO bias. Many AFL officers were therefore reluctant to 
test their support against the CIO in a certification
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election. Rasmussen was "surprised" at the AFL's "apparent 
lack of confidence in the NLRB," particularly after the 
Board had recently forced many notorious open-shop employers 
to the bargaining table. Rasmussen also counted on 
craftworkers resenting the AFL's autocratic methods.
Although the AFL professed "'democracy'," and local 
autonomy, the federation had "slapped [the switchmen's 
union] with a $20.00 assessment fee before the ink was dry 
on [their] charter."16
Local Mine-Mill officers believed they could exploit 
these weaknesses, but only with the international union's 
support. Rasmussen noted that fatalistic members "who have 
always hung crape [sic] on everything in the past, are 
convinced that the job can be done with some help from" 
Mine-Mill. Rasmussen's own assessment of the situation was 
cautiously optimistic. Despite the AFL's initiative, there 
was "no question" that Mine-Mill could "rebuild a very 
important section of our jurisdiction ...[within a] short 
period of time"; however, Mine-Mill had to move quickly to 
prevent the AFL from signing separate contracts for the 
craftworkers. Mine-Mill had "by far the best chance" to 
organize the area's workers along industrial lines, but if 
they failed to act the AFL would split the copperworkers 
into a "dozen, or more craft units." Reflecting on the 
change in worker and employer attitudes in the wake of the 
trainmen's contract, Rasmussen mused that "someone is going
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to have this company under contract before long."17
Although Mine-Mill's Executive Board had targeted the 
Ely district for organization, Robinson and Rasmussen 
clashed over the selection of organizers. This debate was 
an important manifestation of a larger power struggle 
between the two, who were also split on tactics concerning 
an ongoing contract dispute with Utah Copper at this 
time.18
Each man pursued a different agenda. On one hand, 
Robinson continued his organizational strategy, begun in the 
late 193 0s, of using hand-picked, left-wing activists. He 
defended his choices by citing his successful record and 
uncanny instinct for organizational activity.19 Rasmussen, 
on the other hand, wanted District Board members to retain a 
large measure of autonomy from the international. His 
strongest support was in the copper districts west of Salt 
Lake City and into Nevada, and he tried repeatedly to fill 
his district with rank-and-file organizers from that area.
He was, in effect, trying to accomplish on a regional level 
what he accused Robinson of doing on a national level. 
Throughout the next two years, this friction led to 
compromise choices unsatisfactory to either Rasmussen or 
Robinson and hampered efforts to successfully organize the 
Ely district.
Calling the Ely district "too important to lose," 
Rasmussen requested that two organizers be assigned there
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immediately. He chose two members from District Two, one 
from Utah and one from Nevada.20 Arguing that a successful 
campaign would benefit the entire union, Rasmussen defended 
the expense of two organizers: "we will never regret the 
spending of money for organizational activity here at this 
time."21
Ignoring Rasmussen's suggestions, Robinson appointed L. 
G. Robison, a rank-and-file organizer from Rasmussen's 
current Utah Copper campaign at Bingham Canyon. Robinson 
justified his decision to use only one organizer by claiming 
that District Two was "loaded to capacity with organizers," 
and the union's dwindling finances made it "impossible" to 
add another one. Robinson also claimed that "past 
experience" had shown that his opinions on "organizational 
matters...have been substantially correct."22
Rasmussen angrily charged that countermanding a Board 
Member's recommendation was "uncalled for and wholly out of 
line with the proper functions of [the union president's] 
good office." He argued that, despite its ambitious plans, 
the union was not yet completely committed to organizing the 
important Western copper mines and smelters, where he 
claimed "less than half...[were] receiving any attention." 
The opportunity was at hand for launching a concerted 
campaign to organize all Kennecott's properties. The large 
potential membership only justified hiring two organizers 
because "they could pay their way with the new members they
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could bring into the organization."23
Rasmussen asserted that Robison, his "most important" 
organizer, should not be removed from the Utah Copper 
campaign. The transfer would also be a personal hardship 
for Robison, who had unexplained family problems. Robison 
was "the type of fellow who does not do justice to himself 
or the cause unless Mrs. Robison is with him." Robison's 
removal provided fodder for a growing separatist movement 
among Utah members opposed to Robinson. Rasmussen warned 
that if Mine-Mill did not act quickly and with a substantial 
commitment, "we might as well make the A. F. of L. a present 
of [the Ely district]."24
By the time Rasmussen voiced these objections, Robison 
had already been sent to the Ely district. On April 28, 
Robinson ordered him "to start organizational work" and to 
determine how "an immediate drive can be successful."25 
During his brief tenure in the Ely district, Robison was 
distracted by his desire to return to his family and to 
resume work on the Utah Copper campaign. Confessing that 
Board Member Rasmussen was "somewhat exercised," Robinson 
solicited Robison's own opinion about his transfer.26
Robison's poignant response reveals the daily 
sacrifices made by union organizers. They were paid low 
wages, traveled long distances, constantly feared 
harassment, intimidation, and violence, and, for those that 
were married, experienced long periods of separation from
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their families. For organizers who did not rise to an
administrative position, their career was a balancing act
between professional and personal concerns. When they did
not organize an area, they carried this loss with them as a
personal failure.
Like many others who travelled to Nevada during the
early 1940s, Robison confronted a severe housing shortage
caused by the influx of defense workers. He found the Ely
area to be "a very expensive place to live" with not "much
chance to find living quarters for a family." A single room
at a "second rate hotel" was "very scarce and hard to get,"
and was expensive at $3.00 per day.27 Even after he
obtained more "satisfactory" living quarters, he longed for
his wife and children left behind in Utah. Robison remarked
that he "would much rather have my family here than be
separated" and planned to get a larger "place to live" for
his family "as soon as the kids are out of school."28 When
asked by Robinson if he resented the transfer, Robison
replied that he was "more than [just] a little" disappointed
by the move. Nevertheless, he passionately summed up his
commitment to the union:
I have always felt that it was my duty to the 
organization to go where I was sent and to do the best 
I could.... I shall to the best of my ability try to 
[carry] on as best I can. My feeling has always been 
that we must learn to subordinate self to the common 
good if we are to be of value to the organization. We 
must all realize that the working force of the 
International must be directed [by the union's 
officers] and even though it is sometimes 
inconvenient for us, we must make the best of the
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situation... .29
Robison yearned to return to work on the "very important" 
Utah Copper campaign, but he agreed that the Ely district 
was equally vital to the union and that his leaving Utah 
would "not...hurt the situation there."
Robison remained in the Ely area for only twenty-four 
days.30 However, during his brief stay he managed to 
provide an extensive analysis of the district that showed 
the rising presence of the AFL and subsequent reformation of 
the informal equilibrium. While he grappled with the unique 
character of Ely-district industrial relations, Robison's 
tactics also reveal the intellectual function of the union 
organizer.
Robison echoed Rasmussen's contention that the AFL was 
experiencing a period of rising aspirations. Robison found 
that many workers saw no distinction between craft-based and 
industrial unionism. He commented that most of the workers 
"seem[ed] to think the crafts are OK," including "quite a 
few" Mine-Mill members. Robison advised "not interfer[ing] 
with the crafts," but believed a slow, wise campaign could 
organize the workers "without trouble." He predicted that a 
"letdown" would occur once the AFL failed to secure a 
contract with Nevada Consolidated. Then the workers could 
"be shown the absolute necessity of organizing industrially 
if they are to better conditions."31
Robison's correspondence indicates that informal
equilibrium had indeed returned. The McGill smelterworkers 
maintained a small core of active union members, while the 
Kimberly miners discarded any semblance of unionism. 
Similarly, the companies resorted to their old tactics. 
Nevada Consolidated attracted the stable smelterworkers' 
loyalty with paternalistic welfare capitalism, while 
Consolidated Coppermines confronted the more transient 
miners with antiunionism. If spontaneous unionism occurred, 
it would not be among the smelterworkers, but among the 
miners, a fact that Robison failed to grasp. In what would 
become a key point of disagreement over tactics, Reid 
Robinson, who sensed the unique situation in the Ely 
district, advised Robison to first concentrate on the miners 
because they would "be easier to organize...than the 
smeltermen," and that "success" there would spread to 
McGill.32
Robison, however, did not recognize the dynamics of 
industrial relations in the Ely district. He believed that 
Mine-Mill should "try to encourage the group that is working 
at McGill and give them what assistance is possible."
During open meetings, the workers at McGill "seemed very 
receptive" to Robison's message. Besides a core of active 
members, there were "some pretty live union men" that 
Robison believed "should come along." One glaring weakness 
for organizing the plant industrially was clearly evident.
At the meetings, Robison observed the "complete absence" of
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foreign-born workers, who made up "quite a large number" of 
the smelter's laborers and semiskilled industrial 
workforce.33 Despite this intraclass division, he 
nonetheless recommended that organization begin at McGill.
His conclusion ignored Robinson's suggestion that 
initial organization should center on Ruth and Kimberly, 
where conditions at the mines contrasted sharply with the 
smelter town. Robison found there was little AFL presence 
at the mines— they had "nothing" at Kimberly and "very 
little" at Ruth. But the miners were not necessarily 
hospitable to the CIO either. Mine-Mill had "the past to 
overcome" at the mines because of its lack of support during 
the late 1930s.34
Robison found "rotten" conditions at Kimberly. Above 
ground, living costs were high and living conditions "very 
bad." Underground, the mines were unventilated, the company 
used the speedup and the illegal one-man system, and the 
accident rate was "terrible." A legacy of union corruption 
and a highly mobile work force were Robison's chief 
obstacles at the mines. When the Kimberly local had been 
declared defunct in 1940, there apparently had been a 
"financial scandal" which further discredited the union. 
There were quite a number of union men in Kimberly, but 
these were transients who, because conditions were "so bad," 
only "stay[ed] long enough for a road stake," shuttling 
between Nevada and Climax, Colorado. This unsettled
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environment was made worse by the presence of antiunion 
foremen and workers. He observed "quite a gang of finks" 
employed at the Kimberly mines, including some "head 
finks,"— foremen "who made themselves infamous by their... 
activity in Silverton, Colorado."35
Despite "plenty of dissatisfaction because of 
conditions," wages were "as high or higher than surrounding 
camps." Wages throughout the district had improved since 
the trainmen signed their contracts, as part of the 
companies' two-pronged strategy to defuse growing unionism. 
"Evidently" aware of "considerable union sentiment in the 
district," both companies granted a twenty-five cent wage 
increase on May 1. Although the wage increase was a typical 
Nevada Consolidated response, Consolidated Coppermines went 
one step further in making known its displeasure with 
increased union activity, briefly laying-off about sixty 
miners when it cut thirty minutes off the workday at 
Kimberly. The ostensible reason for this move was the 
company's belated recognition of the three-year-old federal 
Wage and Hour Law which mandated a shorter workday.
However, the antiunion message was clear when they hired 
these workers back a few days later.
Robison aptly described the district's two systems of 
industrial relations. Nevada Consolidated used "the old 
paternalism more," he noted, "with pretty good effect," 
while Consolidated Coppermines had "a decided antiunion
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complex" and would "prob[ably] fight [Mine-Mill] every inch 
of the way." Both the wage increase and the layoff "cooled 
the boys off there for a time," slowing union activity for 
several weeks.36
Robison launched the Ely organizational drive with a
mass meeting in McGill on April 30, his first night in the
district, and continued to hold these gatherings throughout 
his stay. He then began establishing a network of contacts 
to better assist him with an educational campaign. Two 
weeks after his arrival, he wrote to the international union 
requesting a list of workers who had written "urgent
requests" to Rasmussen in April. Meanwhile, he started
circulating among the "right people"— those employees and 
other Ely-area residents sympathetic to Mine-Mill's brand of 
unionism. At the old Wobbly stronghold of Riepetown, he 
found a supporter in Mrs. Corak, who operated the Miners 
Club, "a combination boarding house and saloon," and 
presumably a haven for conferences to learn the local 
gossip. Before leaving, he planned to distribute the CIO 
News, using the McGill and Ruth officers to help out at 
their respective sites, while trying to get enough men to 
"cover the different shifts" at the Kimberly mine.37
Robison's attitude mirrored Rasmussen's when assessing 
the union's chances in the area. In the middle of his 
campaign, he saw a "grand opportunity" for Mine-Mill to make 
"some real progress," but later learned of four internal
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weaknesses within the locals that made organizing the 
district difficult.38 First, rank-and-file workers 
resented that fact that officers had used the locals as 
"political stepping stones." For example, R. N. Gibson, 
Nevada's Labor Commissioner, began his political career as a 
Mine-Mill officer in Local 124. Second, there were a 
"number of old feuds" among the remaining members. Robison 
recommended that any organizer who came to the area "listen 
much and talk little on some of these pet peeves." Third, 
many long-time members characterized any Mine-Mill 
representative as "either a drunkard[,] a thief[,] or a son 
of a bitch of some kind." Robison noted that the district 
was "no pleasant place" for an organizer until a turnover in 
labor force brought "new blood" into the district. Finally, 
because of the combination of these conditions the locals 
had "stagnated," with little interest left outside a core of 
active members. Nevertheless, Robison predicted that the 
situation "will correct itself if new membership can be 
brought in and some activity stirred up."39
Robison also stressed the statewide significance of the 
Ely-district copper industry. Nevada Consolidated's 
treatment of its workforce was carefully observed by miners 
everywhere, who Robison claimed "badly needed" organization. 
In some of the state's other mining towns, "things [were] in 
bad shape"— workers received low wages ($4.25 per day), 
companies ignored overtime provisions, and used antiunion
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tactics "unknown in organized districts." Organizing Nevada 
Consolidated was, as Robison concluded, "the key to entire 
state of Nevada. "40
Robison would not witness any changes in the Ely 
district. On May 24, Reid Robinson ordered him to return to 
the Bingham Copper campaign.41 Whether this move was 
simply the result of Robison's dissatisfaction, Robinson's 
frustration that he was not getting the best work out of the 
organizer, or Rasmussen's constant pressure is unknown. 
Despite Robison's departure, neither Robinson nor Rasmussen 
intended to neglect the Ely district. They clashed once 
more over the selection of the most suitable organizer for 
the district.
Again claiming to have received "many urgent pleas" 
from the Ely district, Rasmussen submitted another roster of 
Utah and Nevada rank-and-file organizers. He warned that if 
an organizer was not immediately sent to the Ely district, 
the "recent program will die out for want of aid." This 
would not only destroy the members' morale, it would be 
"another broken promise...chalked up against the 
International." And, he cautioned, Mine-Mill was "not good 
for many more of them" in the Ely district.42
Reid Robinson also wanted to place the organizer of his 
choice in the Ely district. Less than a week after 
Robison's transfer, Howard Goddard, Robinson's 
organizational assistant, indicated that the union was
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planning to assign another organizer to Ely district and 
asked Robison for a "complete report on the status of 
organization,11 including "all contacts [and] activities."43 
Ignoring Rasmussen, Robinson began his own search for a 
replacement and by this time had apparently decided to 
select someone outside of Rasmussen's District Two 
stronghold. In June, he remarked that he was "still 
searching for a competent organizer for Nevada" and would 
"try to get one in there as quickly as possible."44
Throughout the summer, Rasmussen continued to prod 
Robinson. In a report to the Executive Board, Rasmussen 
noted that the Ely-district locals were in "serious 
condition" because of "lack of help." Although the members' 
"numerous requests" had been relayed to Robinson, "to date, 
nothing has been done toward rebuilding" their locals, which 
were "situated in a very important section" of the copper 
industry. Rasmussen optimistically believed that a 
"constructive ...program" could easily organize all the 
employees at the McGill smelter "within a reasonable length 
of time." Rasmussen appealed to Robinson for "immediate 
...help" in the Ely district.45
At the same time, Local 233 officers were lobbying the 
international union to send another organizer before the 
workers' enthusiasm completely dissipated. In May, Local 
233 financial secretary E. H. Hakenson urged starting 
another campaign with dedicated, "live wire" organizers.
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Goddard assured him that the union was "making every effort 
to secure" the type of organizer Hakenson requested, but 
they were in short supply. Increased organizational 
activity throughout the "entire CIO" had "developed to such 
an extent" that it was "very difficult to obtain competent 
organizers on the spur of the moment." Goddard confided 
that he had several people in mind and would, in time, make 
the necessary arrangements to place one in White Pine 
County.46
Hakenson, who was one of the "double-heading" 
machinists, reported that "several brothers stressed the 
urgent need for speed" in sending an organizer because of 
the AFL "activities." He was particularly distressed that 
the rival federation's progress had occurred while Mine- 
Mill 's international leaders debated over the selection of 
an organizer. By mid-June, the AFL was on the verge of 
filing a petition for an NLRB certification election. The 
craft locals had been "rapidly" expanding by utilizing CIO 
tactics. Hakenson noted that the AFL was "taking in 
employees engaged in repair work whom formerly they wouldn't 
consider." Mine-Mill members in the skilled trades were 
also being pressed to shift to AFL. "47
Hakenson cited a vast pool of workers— "between three 
hundred fifty and four hundred men under thirty five years 
of age"— that the union needed to actively recruit because 
"a great many...[had] never belonged to a labor union."
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Hakenson advised that July would be a good time to send an 
organizer when the local was "shifting in the [new] 
officers," and there would be "three or four members who can 
and will render splendid service." He claimed all they 
needed was "someone to 'spark' and to direct our organizing 
activities. "48
Throughout the summer of 1941, the union failed to 
respond to Hakenson's entreaties. At Mine-Mill's annual 
convention in August, Robinson promised the Ely delegation 
that there would be an organizer in their district within 
thirty days. However, Robinson's vow came too late to stop 
the AFL offensive. That same month, the machinists at both 
McGill and Ruth and the Ruth electricians filed petitions 
for NLRB certification elections.49
Rasmussen continued to debate the organizer question 
with Robinson. In September, Rasmussen complained that an 
organizer had not yet been appointed to the area and 
suggested four potential candidates, again drawn from the 
Nevada-Utah rank and file.50 By this time, Robinson had 
finally selected George Haskell, a former Teamster organizer 
from California, who had been recommended by Maurice Travis, 
a Mine-Mill international representative based in Martinez, 
California.51
Robinson's and Travis' joint opposition to Rasmussen's 
candidates is crucial to understanding the internal dynamics 
within Mine-Mill at this time, as well as explaining the
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type of organizer that Robinson preferred. They viewed 
Rasmussen's recommendations as provincial and unwilling to 
make the sacrifices that the job required, sacrifices, that 
even conservative CIO president John L. Lewis knew left-wing 
organizers gladly accepted. Despite his professed 
commitment to the union, Robison's case of homesickness 
underscores this point.52
The supply of dedicated organizers was a finite 
quantity. If Robinson rejected Rasmussen's selections out 
of hand, then he had to find substitutes, preferably leftist 
organizers that agreed with his progressive vision of the 
union's future. By the 1940s, the West Coast had developed 
a strong contingent of left-wing labor activists. In an 
environment that contained Harry Bridges, the doyen of 
American left-wing unionism, such organizers flourished— and 
Robinson wanted them. Getting them approved by a Board that 
preferred organizers drawn from their own membership was 
another matter.53
Robinson submitted Haskell's name to the Executive 
Board in late August. By the end of September, the divided 
Board had yet to decide on his appointment.54 Trying to 
rally support for Haskell, Paul E. Burns, a business agent 
for Mine-Mill Local 50 in San Francisco, strongly 
recommended him for the post. Possibly prompted by Travis, 
Burns praised Haskell's earlier work for the Teamsters in 
Los Angeles, and testified that he was Local 50's "most
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capable organizer" who was "100% in any situation.1,55
In September Goddard informed Hakenson about Haskell's 
appointment. Goddard explained that until the Board 
approved or rejected Haskell, it would "be a practical 
impossibility to assign anyone" to the Ely area and again 
noted there was "acute shortage of organizers throughout the 
International Union."56
On September 27, Haskell was belatedly approved by the 
Executive Board. Informing Hakenson of the good news, 
Goddard reminded him to give Haskell "all possible 
assistance in familiarizing him with the local situation and 
acquainting him with the membership," and recommended that 
the two combine on a "program of organization" for the Ely 
district.57 The "live wire" organizer was finally on the 
way.
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CHAPTER FIVE
"SUCH CONTENTED WORKERS," OCTOBER 1941-DECEMBER 1942
Arriving in McGill, Nevada, on October 2, 1941, Mine- 
Mill organizer George Haskell guickly noticed a phenomenon 
he would encounter throughout his five-month organizational 
campaign: "Never in my life," Haskell wrote after that first 
day, "have I seen such a contented bunch of workers."1 
Within two years, these same workers would be members of one 
of America's most progressive unions.
Haskell recognized the outward manifestation of the 
informal equilibrium at McGill that acknowledged company 
hegemony. The smelterworkers maintained a small union 
local, while the miners eschewed unionism and used 
geographical mobility to register displeasure with their 
deplorable conditions. The only difference from the 1920s 
was the growing presence of the AFL craft unions. Haskell 
promoted industrial unionism as a means of unraveling Nevada 
Consolidated's system of class domination. Although 
Haskell's campaign failed, it illustrates the organizer's 
function as an "organic intellectual," by encouraging the 
formation of a collective opposition to company hegemony.
In September 1941, Robinson's assistant, Howard
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Goddard, officially appointed Haskell, then living in San 
Francisco, as an international organizer for the Ely 
district.2 Goddard, aware of Robison's earlier warnings, 
advised Haskell to "spend the first week or so...getting 
acquainted with the local people."3 Arriving in the Ely 
district on October 2, Haskell ignored Goddard's 
recommendation to proceed cautiously and immediately called 
a meeting of the members of Local 233 to familiarize himself 
with what he called the workers' "organizing problem." 
Despite the apparent lack of militancy, Haskell echoed 
Robison's belief that the potential for mass organization 
existed among the McGill smelterworkers.4
While it was clear to Haskell that working conditions 
at the smelter were "very good," the company appeared 
vulnerable to unionism. The workers desired a contract, a 
dues check-off, and a revision of the existing vacation 
policy of five days off after six years employment— demands 
Nevada Consolidated traditionally refused to negotiate. 
Haskell settled on these three issues— contract, check-off, 
and vacation— as his "talking points toward organizing" 
others at the smelter.
Haskell favored directly criticizing Nevada 
Consolidated to raise the workers' consciousness. The 
active McGill Mine-Mill members, however, disapproved of 
this strategy. They remembered the international's failure 
to support them in the past and were wary of provoking a
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confrontation with the company. Now that prosperity had 
returned to the copper industry, most members preferred 
instead to mediate their grievances through the informal 
equilibrium. The day Haskell arrived, cautious members 
warned him that if he "had any intention of saying anything 
against the management, or the company, [he] had better pack 
up and go back where [he] came from."5
Forbidden from criticizing Nevada Consolidated and thus 
unraveling its welfare capitalist hegemony, Haskell opted 
for an approach he termed "diplomatic organizing," which 
required a time-consuming educational campaign. For 
example, he showed Mine-Mill-negotiated contracts and other 
literature on industrial unionism to the "new workers" who 
"have no idea at all what unionism is." He also utilized 
standard tactics: distributing copies of the CIO News at the 
plant's entrance, canvassing workers' homes, and holding 
frequent meetings. Haskell decided to continue 
organizational activity in McGill where, despite his 
reservations, there was "a lot more enthusiasm towards 
organizing" than either Ruth or Kimberly.6
Although the two mining towns were "the ones that 
really need[ed] organizing the most," severe obstacles 
existed at both sites. Haskell found such terrible 
conditions and antiunionism at Kimberly that he termed it 
nothing more than a "transient camp." The miners "stay long 
enough to get a stake and then pull out as soon as they get
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it, if they are able." Haskell received a cool reception, 
remarking that "[a]11 the men act as though they are afraid 
to be seen talking to an organizer."7
Attitudes toward the union were no better at Ruth, 
where there was "little interest left" in Local 124. Only a 
handful of members were willing to assist in reorganization 
despite a "standing offer" of fifty cents paid any member 
who enrolled a new recruit (Haskell noted that "so far no 
one has earned that offer"). The Ruth miners told Haskell 
that "the international let them down last time they started 
a drive by taking the organizer out just when they had 
started to accomplish something." They promised to remain 
uncommitted until Mine-Mill assigned a full-time organizer 
"to finish what he starts." Haskell hoped that if the Ruth 
and Kimberly miners saw the results at McGill "they in turn 
will fall right in line."8
Remarkably, Haskell seemed on the verge of a 
breakthrough by the end of his first month in the area. On 
October 29, he invited the district's workers to an open 
meeting to discuss "contracts, vacation, seniority, checkoff 
and job security."9 Haskell was initially disappointed 
because only 108 men had attended, until members informed 
him that it was a "pretty big gathering for this area." 
Featuring speeches by several Utah CIO officers, including 
Rasmussen, the meeting surpassed even their limited 
expectations. Indicative of the local's apparent progress,
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six new members joined that night.10 This meeting did not 
mark a turning point, however. Instead, it would be 
Haskell's last successful venture in the Ely district.
The initial setback occurred at the end of October when 
Haskell first learned of the coming NLRB hearings on the 
petitions submitted by the Ruth International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers (IBEW) and International Association of 
Machinists (IAM), which represented both the mine and 
smelter. The Board informed the startled Haskell that 
hearings would be held in early November. Haskell found the 
IAM's petition particularly alarming because Local 233's 
president and financial secretary were both machinists. He 
secured a delay until December 9 and set about gathering 
witnesses to block the certification elections.11 At the 
hearings, the NLRB denied Mine-Mill's claim that the plant 
should be organized as an industrial union. The Board also 
rejected the IBEW's petition, but approved the IAM's request 
for a certification election.12
Just prior to the NLRB hearings the United States 
entered World War II, creating novel conditions that 
thwarted Mine-Mill's campaign for more than a year. The 
coming of the war heightened community loyalty toward Nevada 
Consolidated. This is understandable given the anxiety that 
prevailed immediately after Pearl Harbor. Seeking security, 
workers and their families retreated further into Nevada 
Consolidated's paternalism to cope with the initial
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pressures generated by the war's outbreak.13
The citizens of White Pine County responded to pleas 
for increased production and civilian mobilization with an 
intense fervor. The area's Mine-Mill locals would not be 
revitalized until the crisis finally abated in January 1943. 
Using its familiar power to interpret the meaning of war 
production and to effectively mobilize the entire 
population, Nevada Consolidated dampened unionism by sheer 
domination of the economic and social life of the Ely 
district, especially at McGill.
Even before the full impact of the war was realized, 
the Pearl Harbor attack unleashed a wave of anti-Japanese 
hysteria and prompted an intensive civilian defense program. 
Nevada historian Russell Elliott, a McGill native, recalled 
the "tense" atmosphere in his hometown immediately following 
the outbreak of the war. By December 11, following a 
petition by the Ruth miners, more than one hundred of the 
district's Japanese workers were placed under house arrest 
with the full approval of Nevada Consolidated's management. 
Elliott claims the primary cause of the hysteria was fear of 
sabotage because of copper's importance as a strategic 
metal. However, festering racism, exacerbated by the 
company's segregationist housing policies, also contributed 
to the wave of paranoia that swept the area.14
Both Haskell's reaction and Mine-Mill's official 
response to the arrest and subsequent removal of eighty to
one hundred Japanese nationals, reveal their attitudes 
concerning the treatment of foreign-born workers during 
World War II. While the evidence is unclear, Haskell 
apparently defended the civil rights of the Ely-area 
Japanese workers after the bombing of Pearl Harbor.
His efforts were not completely sanctioned by Mine-Mill. 
Allen McNeil, who had replaced Howard Goddard as Reid 
Robinson's assistant, admonished Haskell for not being 
"sufficiently tactful," although McNeil was "sure [that 
Haskell was] perfectly right in what [he] did in regard to 
protecting the Japanese workers at McGill."15 Haskell's 
defense of the Japanese workers may have alienated him from 
Local 233's rank and file, who later backed Nevada Governor 
E. P. Carville's opposition to a proposed 1943 plan to 
import Japanese workers into the state to relieve a chronic 
labor shortage.16
Despite its role in the internment of Japanese workers, 
Nevada Consolidated otherwise responded more constructively 
to the war's outbreak by establishing a comprehensive 
community defense plan. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, the 
company organized several defense committees, including an 
"anti-sabotage" council. The Red Cross began classes on 
first aid, and the company allowed "about 35 men per day" to 
donate blood. Haskell witnessed the complete mobilization 
of the town's population, noting that "[e]very man and woman 
in McGill and Ruth have registered with the Civil Defense,
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and have all been assigned to jobs[,] such as warden, 
firemen, etc." Female stenographers and clerical workers 
donated their services, and the Boy Scouts collected 
"newspapers, pots, pans, and everything that is of need."17 
Nevada Consolidated thus effectively nullified one of Mine- 
Mill 's trump cards: linking unionism to full production.
Mine-Mill's wartime organizing strategy— termed the 
"productionist ethic"— urged workers to join unions because 
organized labor was best suited to guarantee uninterrupted 
production during the war.18 Mine-Mill hoped to link full 
production, patriotism, and unionism through the following 
circular argument: "[I]n order to get the best kind of
production, we have to be well organized,...because only 
organized workers can really get the best advantage out of 
producing." Antiunionists were therefore "enemies of our 
country" because "those who sabotage the union campaign 
...are also sabotaging the production campaign of the 
company, and are consequently not doing the best they can 
for their nation in these critical times." McNeil urged 
Haskell to make "judicious use" of this argument to recruit 
the McGill workers.19
Establishing a "management-labor" council to oversee 
production soon after the war's outbreak, Nevada 
Consolidated warded off criticism that they omitted labor's 
voice from their wartime production plans. Satisfied that 
their employer was promoting all-out production, the Ely-
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area workers instead saw unionism as unpatriotic and 
antithetical to the war effort. They wanted to cease 
organizational activity, because "in so doing we are not 
cooperating with the government." Nevada Consolidated 
rewarded this sentiment with their typical response— a 
timely twenty-five-cent wage increase,— "which," the hapless 
Haskell moaned, "only makes matters a little more 
complicated. "20
Prior to December 7, Haskell still believed the workers 
were slowly being drawn into the union. By January, 
however, their attitude changed to hostile rejection. Early 
in the campaign, he easily distributed 500 copies of the CIO 
News; by mid-December, only 100 workers accepted the free 
newspaper. Haskell noted that "some of the men take a copy 
and throw it [on] the ground, others give me a growl." When 
canvassing door-to-door, he was invited into only "5 or 10" 
of the town's 500 homes. The workers "claim they are either 
too busy or they don't want to have anything to do with the 
CIO." The open meetings, which originally "had a fairly 
good turnout, had "gradually dwindled down to nothing but 
members," and even they, Haskell starkly observed, "have 
given up." He still thought organization was possible if 
the members "would only plug for me on the inside... but 
they won't do it." Haskell was so isolated that he was 
forced to hire a Boy Scout to distribute union literature 
because the members refused to help.21
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Declaring he had "used diplomacy long enough," Haskell 
started a leaflet campaign aimed against Nevada 
Consolidated, which, he warned McNeil, "may not be mild." 
Haskell requested that McNeil dig up "any dirt on Nevada 
Consolidated that they are dishing out anywhere in the 
country" to use in his handbills.22 McNeil cautioned 
Haskell to only give the workers "some of the facts" about 
Nevada Consolidated "without entering into a full-fledged 
attack on them."23 With the informal equilibrium firmly 
entrenched, these aggressive tactics proved even less 
effective than Haskell's earlier "diplomatic" approach.
Before leaving the district, Haskell admitted the 
benefits workers derived from Nevada Consolidated's welfare 
capitalism had stalled the drive. He tried several 
approaches but he could never find the right message or 
tactics to persuade a significant number of workers to join 
the union. Haskell asserted that "to an outsider" the 
benefits of welfare capitalism "are just a coverup for the 
things they haven't got"— a contract, vacation, seniority, 
and union recognition: "It can be plainly seen from the
sidelines, but is not believed by the workers, even our 
members can't be convinced of the fact." Haskell "pounded 
away continually" on these issues, but without results.24
After reviewing Haskell's dismal reports, McNeil 
concluded that Mine-Mill was "wasting a good deal of time in 
McGill." Contrasting Haskell's lack of progress to Mine-
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Mill's "rather successful" negotiations with Nevada 
Consolidated at their Santa Rita, New Mexico operations, 
McNeil wondered "what the devil is wrong with these people 
around McGill in our own union." On February 6, he 
recommended Haskell's transfer to the Miami-Globe region in 
Arizona.25 The dejected Haskell accepted the move where, 
he hoped, "some good can be done."26
In the ten months following Haskell's transfer, Local 
233's membership dwindled to twelve active members and the 
local failed to attract a single recruit for an entire 
year.27 Not until January 1943 did this trend dramatically 
reverse. In the interim, unionism throughout the district 
declined.
Both Robinson and Rasmussen agreed that Mine-Mill 
should continue organizational activity. In late February 
1942, Robinson received Executive Board approval to hire two 
organizers for Nevada, "who would be mutually agreed upon 
between" him and Rasmussen.28 Although it initially 
appeared that they would quickly assign another organizer to 
replace Haskell, once again this decision was delayed.
In the meantime, activity among the locals 
deteriorated. Other national unions were aware of Mine- 
Mill's declining presence. In March, District 50, the 
United Mine Worker's catchall industrial union, apparently 
considered organizing the Ely copperworkers. McNeil 
informed Rasmussen of rumors about a man named "Mitchell,
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from District 50 from the Coast," who "expects to go into 
McGill" and try "to swing some of our boys his way." McNeil 
urged Rasmussen to "put a stop to any such development 
before it gets underway."29 Mine-Mill also had to contend 
with both companies, who again trotted out traditional and 
timely tactics to suppress unionism. In June 1942, Nevada 
Consolidated and Consolidated Coppermines announced "double 
increases" of fifty cents per day for all day wage earners, 
that reports claimed "raised the [district's pay] scale 
considerably.1,30
Everything seemed to be coming apart for Mine-Mill in 
the Ely district. In a September memorandum to Robinson, 
McNeil wrote that "indications [for] organizational 
possibilities exist," but advised against a campaign because 
of "lack of funds and personnel." McNeil's views on the Ely 
district paralleled his assessment of the entire District 
Two, where the locals were "lagging" and there was a 
"serious need for stabilization." Because of numerous 
problems— including "obtaining maximum dues payments"— he 
counselled that it would be "unwise" for the union to begin 
new organizational activity.31
By the beginning of 1943, Local 233 even began debating 
whether to withdraw from the international union. On 
January 9, Hakenson wrote McNeil requesting that the 
international union send a representative to their January 
13 meeting, when the smelterworkers would consider a motion
to leave Mine-Mill.32 Robinson ordered Glen Freeman, an 
organizer in the Utah Copper campaign who had briefly spent 
some time in Ely a year earlier, to attend the meeting and 
oppose the motion.33 The smelterworkers may have been 
merely trying to attract an organizer into the district, 
where unionism was reviving at the Kimberly mines. There is 
no record of a vote on the motion and Local 233 remained in 
the union; nevertheless, its message was clear; unless the 
international union supported the local there was no 
guarantee it would remain affiliated with Mine-Mill. The 
activity at Kimberly soon reversed this sentiment. Over the 
next seven months, Mine-Mill began a torrid campaign to 
organize the Ely-district copperworkers.
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CHAPTER SIX
"TWO-BIT RAISES" AND FORMAL EQUILIBRIUM,
JANUARY 1943-SEPTEMBER 1943
By the beginning of 1943, conditions in the Ely 
district again seemed favorable for union organization. 
First, Mine-Mill assigned a seasoned organizer who devised a 
strategy that successfully attracted support away from the 
AFL. Second, the federal government was on the union's 
side. The NLRB helped the Kimberly miners complete a rapid 
and spontaneous organizational campaign by blocking a 
potential AFL counteroffensive. Finally, unstable labor 
market conditions that led to worker discontent underpinned 
the upsurge in union activity. By September 1943, Mine- 
Mill-affiliated locals served as the bargaining agent for 
all the Kimberly miners and for most of the workers at Ruth 
and McGill.
A primary cause of this transformation was a change in 
the Ely-area workforce, exacerbated by an "acute" labor 
shortage in the copper industry beginning in the summer of 
1942. The military's "insatiable demand" for copper, the 
drafting of young male workers, and the appeal of higher- 
paying West Coast defense production jobs forced Nevada
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Consolidated and Consolidated Coppermines to hire new 
workers from outside the district to maintain full 
production. Fluidity in the labor market led to the 
increased presence of employees who held no previous loyalty 
towards Nevada Consolidated.
At Kimberly, government sanctions prevented the miners 
from leaving the area, cutting off their usual method of 
registering discontent.1 The clearest indication of worker 
resistance was increased absenteeism.2 Chafing at rising 
living costs and "frozen" into their jobs by government 
order, the Ely-district copperworkers sought to remedy 
increasing wartime constrictions through unionization.
Not surprisingly, the impetus for the successful 1943 
drive came from the miners themselves. Keith Norton, an 
active Mine-Mill member at Kimberly, helped spur the sudden 
burst of unionism. On January 15 he wrote Reid Robinson 
requesting a charter for the burgeoning Kimberly local. 
Norton had attracted 177 initiates in just three days and 
promised 400 more within a short time. Confident that the 
entire camp of 855 workers would join the union, he wanted 
Mine-Mill to send "the best [organizer]... available."3 
Even before an organizer arrived, the newly-christened 
Kimberly Local 642 had successfully petitioned for an NLRB 
election.4 Robinson later singled out Norton for "hav[ing] 
done an especially good job of laying the ground work."5
When Robinson failed to respond to his first letter,
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Norton sent an urgent telegram imploring the international 
to take action and invited Robinson himself to visit the 
area himself to see that "these boys want action."6 
Robinson belatedly replied on February 2, promising to 
assign an organizer "immediately."7 The same day he 
responded to Norton's plea for assistance, Robinson ordered 
Mine-Mill Board Member and organizer Claud Lovelett, 
testifying in another NLRB case in San Francisco, to inspect 
"spontaneous organization" in the Ely area.8
The surge of unionism at Kimberly was felt throughout 
the district. At McGill, Local 233 began expanding rapidly. 
Claiming only eight active members in January 1943, it had 
forty-eight workers enrolled a month later, with thirty-one 
more promising to join. Forty-five of these initiates took 
the oath on February 17, coinciding with Lovelett's arrival 
in McGill.9 Unlike the situation faced by Haskell in 
1941, Lovelett found workers at both the mines and smelter 
eager for organization. His primary task would be to 
prevent the companies and the AFL from winning back the 
workers' loyalty.
Ely-area employers had historically paid higher rates 
than other Western copper districts primarily because of the 
dangerous underground mining at Kimberly and because of 
Nevada Consolidated's policy of welfare capitalism. As 
noted in Chapter Five, both companies had increased wages 
twenty-five cents in January 1942. Another fifty-cent pay
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raise followed later that year, keeping wages ahead of other 
Western copper districts.10
This system began to unravel in January 1943 when 
Montana miners were awarded a wage boost that put their 
scale ahead of the Ely district.11 On March 6, both 
companies responded by announcing that they had filed 
requests with the War Labor Board (WLB), the government 
agency overseeing wartime wage adjustments, to equalize 
wages with Montana.12 It appeared once again that the 
companies would stave off another attempt to organize the 
area— until Lovelett learned there was no record of the 
companies' request.
In late March, Lovelett confirmed that the WLB's 
Nonferrous Metals Commission (NMC) had yet to receive an 
application from either company for a wage increase. Armed 
with a case of employer duplicity, Lovelett predicted that 
this news "will do [Mine-Mill] a lot of good" especially 
with workers reluctant to join. The news "caused quite a 
stir," when he told the Kimberly miners, then awaiting their 
NLRB election, that no request had been submitted.13
After the companies reestablished the validity of their 
requests, Lovelett switched tactics, denigrating the wage 
increase as a "two-bit raise" in his handbill campaign.14 
Nevada Consolidated workers responded enthusiastically to 
this message. In his report after visiting the district, 
Rasmussen wrote: "This is the first time the workers in this
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section of the country have ever been really rioled [sic] up 
about anything,...with the two-bit deal...they are fighting 
mad." Rasmussen admitted he had "almost given up hopes of 
ever seeing the boys at McGill in their present healthy and 
enthusiastic frame of mind." He also claimed that almost 
every smelterworker had paid or promised to join Local 
233.15
In mid-March Local 233 officers sent a letter to the 
NMC rejecting the wage increase, which they now interpreted 
as a tactic to subvert their organizational campaign. An 
appeal to an institution outside the district, this document 
marked the demise of the informal equilibrium. Declaring 
that they were "not a party" to the company's request "in 
any way[,] shape[,] or form," the smelterworkers voiced the 
"strongest possible protest against this so-called wage 
increase." More importantly, they viewed it as "a method 
devised to purchase votes for themselves and against our 
union in the forthcoming [NLRB] election."16
They further claimed that the company "had ample time 
to [increase wages]," but only posted the wage increase once 
they observed the campaign's "splendid progress." Local 233 
officers urged the NMC to reject any wage increase "not 
negotiated with and agreed to by the company's employees." 
Realizing their important position in the production of war 
materiel, the officers threatened that if the increase was 
approved, it would "deal a serious blow to morale of
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employees" and would decrease copper output in a plant that 
was "vitally important to the war effort."17
Having built up some antipathy toward the companies, 
Lovelett turned his attention to the AFL, which was 
attempting to stem the resurgence of industrial unionism.
On March 4, the AFL expelled Mine-Mill from the White Pine 
County Central Labor Council (WPCCLC). (Despite the 
statewide dispute between the AFL and CIO in the 1930s, 
Mine-Mill had later rejoined in WPCCLC.) The AFL barred the 
CIO only after the Kimberly miners submitted their NLRB 
petition requesting a single industrial union at the 
mine.18
Rasmussen noted that the Ely district campaign had 
"broken wide open" after the AFL barred Mine-Mill from the 
WPCCLC. He also claimed the AFL was "blasting the hell out 
of us with the Las Vegas Scandal," referring to the arrest 
of a Mine-Mill organizer during an embattled campaign 
against the AFL at the Basic Magnesium plant.19 The AFL 
was also accusing Mine-Mill of being a Communist union.
Fearing that red-baiting might derail his 
organizational drive, Lovelett countered with an anti-AFL 
leaflet campaign and actively courted AFL members to switch 
to the CIO. He convinced many AFL machinists, whose own 
negotiations with Nevada Consolidated had stalled, to sign 
Mine-Mill membership cards.20 Correctly sensing the mood of 
the workers, Lovelett chose the proper moment to attack both
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the AFL and the companies.
Reid Robinson, however, disapproved of Lovelett's 
decision to go on the offensive. Robinson lauded the Ely 
campaign's "rapid progress" but objected to negative 
campaigning. After seeing one of Lovelett's handbills, 
Robinson warned him that "it will do our program no good to 
carry on a campaign of vilification with the AFL." Perhaps 
fearful of the AFL's entrenched presence in the district, he 
suggested Lovelett use a "positive approach, outlining [the] 
CIO and International Union program." Robinson also advised 
Lovelett to treat the wage increase issue "very carefully." 
By referring to the twenty-five-cent wage increase as a 
"two-bit" raise (as Lovelett did in his handbills), it 
appeared that Mine-Mill was "ridiculing" the offer.
Robinson believed the companies' requests to be genuine and, 
even if they were not, worried that the union could not 
promise the workers a larger increase from the NMC.21
Lovelett defended his strategy on both counts. He was 
"not carrying on any extensive campaign against" the AFL, 
but explaining the "difference between the two organizations 
— especially the gains made by Mine-Mill in WLB cases in 
1942 and the CIO program." He argued that the AFL was "not 
using any discretion, calling Mine-Mill and the CIO "a bunch 
of Reds and God knows what else." [emphasis in original].
He also ignored Robinson's advice about the disputed wage 
request. Not only would he continue mocking the companies'
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"two bit raise," but he would also "protest long and loud" 
about their claim to bring wage rates up to regional 
standards. Lovelett saw "no reason why the Company should 
all at once try and keep the wage here on an even keel with 
other camps." It would take a larger raise than twenty-five 
cents to maintain Ely's higher rate. For example, common 
laborers were only making, what Lovelett facetiously termed, 
"the large sum" of $5.90 per day.22 Whether Lovelett's 
arguments were decisive in winning converts to the union is 
unclear; what is certain was the Kimberly miners' mass 
support for Mine-Mill in their NLRB election.
Given the union's lack of success in the Ely district, 
Mine-Mill's Kimberly election victory was a watershed event, 
establishing an industrial union in the district and 
demonstrating the AFL's limits. At the March 16 hearings 
the NLRB allowed the AFL to contend for twenty-two craft 
workers at the mine, but the AFL quickly relinquished this 
claim.23 Lovelett was "positive" that the AFL, facing 
certain defeat, withdrew from the Kimberly election to avoid 
setting a precedent for McGill and Ruth and thus "having to 
admit [a] second defeat" if it was rejected by the Nevada 
Consolidated workers in their election.
In the final balloting, held on May 12, to select Mine- 
Mill or no union, the Kimberly miners overwhelmingly favored 
the CIO by a 440 to 76 margin.24 The Kimberly victory 
proved the decisive turning point. Lovelett remarked that
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it "strengthened [Mine-Mill's] position in this [a]rea to a 
great extent," and provided momentum for organizing Nevada 
Consolidated.25
The AFL, not company opposition, became Lovelett's most 
pressing problem. At the McGill-Ruth NLRB hearings held 
shortly after the Kimberly election, Mine-Mill successfully 
argued that the workers at the smelter and the mines should 
be combined into one industrial unit for the purpose of 
collective bargaining. This seemingly insignificant victory 
represented a dramatic departure from the status quo. Ruth 
and McGill were traditional rivals in local sporting events, 
and there was little evidence of cooperation between workers 
in two communities. By melding the two locals into one 
unit, Lovelett undermined one of Nevada Consolidated's 
strategies for blunting worker consciousness.26
Mine-Mill tried to block the AFL's request for a "globe 
election." Under this procedure, the NLRB allowed skilled 
workers to determine if they wished to remain in smaller 
craft units or the plantwide industrial unit.27 Mine- 
Mill 's attorney, Abraham Isserman, argued against separate 
elections for the craft workers, terming them "globaloney 
elections" in a legal brief submitted to the NLRB.28
Citing the unique job structure in the copper industry, 
Isserman made a strong case for industrial unionism. If 
craft unions remained, workers who routinely were trained at 
several tasks would be required to join a different union
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every time they moved to a different job classification. He 
also showed that the "craft tradition" no longer existed at 
Nevada Consolidated. Instead of hiring skilled journeymen, 
the company employed unskilled workers who then learned 
their craft at the plant. Isserman concluded by listing 
similar cases where the NLRB ruled in favor of one 
industrial unit.29
Although Mine-Mill claimed membership of sixty-three 
percent of Nevada Consolidated's 1130 employees, the AFL 
wanted to ensure it represented the craft workers in the 
smaller units where it still held a majority— the 
bricklayers, painters, plumbers, iron workers, carpenters, 
boilermakers, and electricians. The AFL countered 
Isserman's arguments by correctly noting that Butte, Montana 
Mine-Mill industrial units had long coexisted with craft 
units.30
Lovelett privately accused the NLRB of favoring the 
AFL. He charged that Trial Examiner Louis Penfield "was by 
no means neutral," but, in fact, sided with the AFL.
Lovelett had "a dirty hunch" that Penfield "was not C.I.O." 
In "many instances" Penfield "reminded Mr. Olds [Fred Olds, 
the AFL's representative] of things that he would have 
forgotten otherwise."31 Ultimately, the Board agreed with 
the AFL, separating all the workers into twelve 
classifications to decide if they wanted to be represented 
by the CIO, the AFL, or no union at all.32
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In the midst of the campaign, Lovelett found himself 
embroiled in a feud with Robinson. The dispute surfaced 
after an April 20 letter from Robinson reminding Lovelett to 
keep his travel expenses within the limitations ($35.00 a 
month) set by the union's governing board.33 Lovelett 
fired back a letter accusing Robinson of "trying to throw 
every obstacle in my way," claiming that "this campaign has 
done more to pay its own way here than any I have seen put 
on in a good long time."34 Two weeks later, Robinson 
demanded an explanation for Lovelett's "caustic attitude" 
and challenged the organizer to list "specific instances" 
when Robinson impeded his work.35 Lovelett, who had 
"intend[ed] to let the matter drop," recounted an incident 
in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho in 1941 when he was denied a proper 
organizing budget that another organizer was later 
granted.36 After this exchange, neither man mentioned the 
dispute for the rest of the campaign.
Lovelett continued to attack the AFL. To do this, he 
solicited testimonials from other CIO unions that had 
rejected the AFL. During a meeting immediately after the 
NLRB hearings, Lovelett read aloud from a letter sent by 
Karl Jensen, secretary for the San Joaquin County 
(California) Industrial Union Council, consisting of former 
AFL unions that had bolted to the CIO. Urging the Ruth- 
McGill workers to vote for Mine-Mill and the CIO, Jensen 
criticized the AFL for "its continuous system of internal
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disputes, Strikes, Lockouts, and high dues, assessments and 
High Initation [sic] fees....without many of the priveleges 
[sic] of a democratic organization," adding that these were 
"benefits which we now enjoy through CIO affiliation."
Jensen likened the AFL's leadership to fascist tyrants: "We 
have three world dictators that we are now putting every 
effort of manpower and money to the front to whip,...let us 
keep our doorstep clean here at home....VOTE CIO."37 
Lovelett admitted that "these kind of letters [do] a lot of 
good in a campaign of this kind."38
On July 1, Lovelett confided that the campaign was 
"continuing to make progress" but there were "great odds" 
since the AFL had an advantage of being able to place a 
great number of organizers in the area. Lovelett colorfully 
noted that although the AFL had "the town full of their pie 
carders," he remained confident Mine-Mill could compete for, 
if not win, every craft unit. He had been told by a "good 
many" of the craftsmen that they did not see a craft unit as 
"any benefit to them when they knew the large majority of 
the employees would choose the CIO as their bargaining 
agency." Additionally, the AFL conceded the groups that 
typically supported the CIO— the common laborers or the 
operating engineers— which included the vast majority of the 
plant.39
Another method Lovelett used to draw worker loyalty 
away from the company was to cultivate a political
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consciousness among the workers. Lovelett encouraged Mine- 
Mill members to confront their political representatives 
about national labor issues. His primary target was the 
AFL-backed Senator Pat McCarren, a professed "friend of 
labor," who Mine-Mill had targeted as an enemy of the CIO 
hiding behind a facade of solidarity with organized labor. 
During the Senate debates considering the antilabor Smith- 
Connally bill, Lovelett noted that "all local unions," aware 
of McCarren's habit of avoiding casting a vote on labor 
bills, were "putting heat on [McCarren] to declare himself 
[against the bill] and get off the fence."40
Robinson approved of this type of activity, encouraging 
Lovelett to pressure politicians "to sit down with [the 
members] in Ely and discuss various legislative matters."41
In August and October 1943, McCarren spoke at the Ely and 
Pioche, where Mine-Mill members directly asked McCarren to 
explain his poor record on labor legislation.42 This was a 
far cry from the Senator's past evasiveness. During a 1938 
speech at Ely, for example, McCarren refused to comment on 
"the conditions or differences of view which may exist 
within the great body of labor" during the Kimberly miners 
ill-fated attempt at NLRB certification.43
At McGill, Lovelett successfully utilized the 
grassroots techniques that Haskell found ineffective. Where 
Haskell worked alone, Lovelett established a rank-and-file 
organizing committee that functioned with "some results,"
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canvassing and recruiting non-members.44 He also found 
innovative ways to maintain the members' interest in the 
campaign. Because of a nearly four-month "lull" caused by 
delay between the hearings and the election, Lovelett 
thought he could get better attendance at the meetings if he 
showed the members "some of the war pictures...ready for 
release" and requested a motion picture projector from 
Robinson.45
As the elections neared, the union began a coordinated 
and concentrated effort to ensure victory. In mid-August 
Robinson, wanting "to leave no stone unturned to win this 
very important election," offered Lovelett "some additional 
assistance in the form of a budget for hand bills, radio 
time, [and] house-to-house contacts...."46 Since there was 
no local radio facility in the district, Lovelett continued 
to use leaflets to publicize the campaign. The 
organizational committees continued house-to-house 
campaigning, and Lovelett, noting that "some additional help 
would be of great assistance," hired two full-time workers 
as assistants.
Lovelett's choices for these assistants reveal the 
political acumen behind his decisions in the days leading up 
to the NLRB election. Because the Mexican workers at Ruth 
were disappointed when their candidate was defeated for 
Local 124's presidency, Lovelett employed a Mexican worker 
from Ruth in hopes of regaining their support. At McGill,
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Lovelett was "very hesitant" to hire part-time workers, 
because it had a "bad effect" on volunteers who received no 
pay for their efforts. E. S. Hakenson, the long-time Local 
233 officer, took a leave of absence to work full time. 
Despite his efforts, Lovelett still failed to convince a 
majority of the skilled workers to switch their allegiance 
to Mine-Mill. Just prior to the election, Lovelett 
correctly predicted that while the union would probably lose 
some of the craft units, it would be the choice of the vast 
majority of Nevada Consolidated's workforce.47
In the NLRB election, Mine-Mill received wide support 
among the industrial workers, but five craft groups chose to 
remain with the AFL. On September 2 and 3 the workers of 
McGill and Ruth voted to determine their collective 
bargaining representative. Although Mine-Mill did not sweep 
the election, it was nevertheless a victory for the new 
regime of industrial relations as nearly all the production 
and maintenance workers in the mines and the smelter gained 
union recognition. Indicative of the campaigning done by 
both Mine-Mill and the AFL, 798 of the 925 eligible voters 
participated in the balloting.48 Had the election been a 
decided by a simple majority vote, Mine-Mill would have won 
easily, garnering fifty-eight percent of the eligible voters 
and seventy-one percent of the ballots counted. In the 
total balloting, the AFL locals fared poorly with just 215 
votes or twenty-three percent of the eligible voters and
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only twenty-eight percent of the valid ballots.49
In the Ely area, the elections were considered a 
sweeping CIO success. The Ely Daily Times' headline blared: 
"C.I.O. Wins Election As Bargaining Agency With Nevada 
Consolidated, Nevada Mines," although the accompanying story 
noted that five craft units had voted for the AFL.50 
Coupled with the union's recent victories at Kennecott's 
Utah and New Mexico properties, the Ely victory was a key 
step to realizing company-wide bargaining. To be sure, the 
election signified a new capitalist era, as the Ely 
district's labor relations quickly conformed to the postwar 
model of institutionalized collective bargaining punctuated 
with intermittent, and sometimes bitter, strikes.
The Mine-Mill organizers in the Ely district from 1941 
to 1943 played an integral role in the formation of this new 
regime. Although they encountered frustration from many 
internal and external sources, they helped the area's 
workers achieve union recognition, an almost impossible task 
before the dislocation caused by World War II. To some 
extent, external conditions set the limits for the "organic 
intellectual." As Haskell discovered, welfare capitalism 
was not easily cast aside. Even though he failed to win the 
workers' loyalty, he continually exposed the shortcomings of 
Nevada Consolidated's policy, albeit to deaf ears.
Lovelett, on the other hand, found both old and new workers 
receptive to his message. Through a sustained critique of
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the companies and the AFL, coupled with skillful 
campaigning, he helped establish Mine-Mill as an entrenched 
presence in the Ely district.
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1. For an overview of the national discussion of the labor 
shortage in nonferrous metals see "Recent Productivity 
Changes in Copper Mining," Monthly Labor Review. (August 
1943), 258-264. The local press extensively covered this 
issue. See Elv Daily Times. July 17, 1942; July 21, 1942; 
Workers volunteered to leave the state. Answering a 
government appeal, 40 Nevada miners volunteered at the Reno 
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1943), 98; "Still a Big Issue," ibid. (July 24, 1943), 94- 
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labor standpoint." He noted that absenteeism caused a "41 
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labor shortage at Kimberly and a twelve percent shortage at 
the nearby Minerva district. Bonner blamed excessive 
alcohol abuse for the problem. He targeted the area's 
saloons, which stayed open twenty-four hours, and called for 
a voluntary closure order which was discussed by local 
leaders but not enacted.
3. Keith Norton to Reid Robinson, January 15, 1943, IUMMSW, 
Box 141, Folder 642, "Ely." An outsider to the district, 
Norton claimed to have been blackballed for organizing Local 
466 in Mountain City, Nevada four years previously. He 
worked as a miner at Kimberly until March 1941 when he was 
injured and became a watchman. Norton also had a pecuniary 
motive. He heard that another Mine-Mill organizer in the
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EPILOGUE
Mine-Mill's victory in the 1943 NLRB election signified 
the final rejection of the informal equilibrium by the Ely- 
district's workers. From that point on, conflict between 
labor and capital would be conducted through the post-World 
War II model of collective bargaining.
Nevada Consolidated's welfare capitalism could not 
survive in this new environment. The company began 
privatizing the company towns in the 1950s, selling its 
homes to the residents. Speaking about this decision, J. C. 
Kinnear's son and successor, John Jr., claimed that the 
company had "acted very wisely in removing one of the last 
vestiges of outmoded paternalism." This move stemmed from 
the changing attitude of the "average employee" who had 
acquired a "more independent attitude," and "preferr[ed] to 
deal on a basis of partnership with his employer." Kinnear 
correctly noted that the company's policies had become 
anachronistic amid the advancing depersonalization of labor 
relations after World War II.1
However, Kinnear wrongly assumed that postwar workers 
desired to deal with employers on an individual basis. 
Instead, workers relied on the institutional structure of
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the labor union to confront their employers. Although 
capitalist hegemony remained, the new process through which 
capital and labor confronted one another had rendered 
obsolete the companies' prewar methods for blunting class 
consciousness. Even as their separate interests were 
formally mediated through the increasingly bureaucratic 
mechanism of collective bargaining, conflict between labor 
and capital continued.
Through their Mine-Mill locals, copperworkers openly 
challenged their employers. In some ways, worker militancy 
reflected that of the early twentieth century. The Ely- 
district joined other Mine-Mill locals in waging a series of 
strikes against the nation's copper companies throughout the 
1950s and early 1960s. At the McGill smelter, workers 
staged several wildcat strikes protesting the company's 
time-and-motion studies and speedup policy, both of which 
violated their existing contract. At other times the 
copperworkers used brief walkouts to mediate their 
grievances. When asked why the union had changed, 
one long-time Mine-Mill officer replied in words that 
indicated paternalism was long gone; "Any company or 
corporation is out to make as big a profit as they can for 
their stockholders....How they do it, they don't care, just 
as long as they do it."2
Unlike some Nevada locals, the Ely-district Mine-Mill 
locals remained affiliated with the international union
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throughout the Cold War period. After World War II, Mine- 
Mill confronted the combined forces of government 
repression, employer opposition, and interunion raiding.
Reid Robinson was ousted in 1947 amid charges he had 
solicited a $5,000 loan from a brass company executive. 
Mine-Mill, long branded a "red" union, then came under fire 
from the government and the increasingly conservative labor 
movement: first, from the refusal of its officers to sign
Taft-Hartley noncommunist affidavits, and second, from the 
CIO's charges of "Communist influence." Expelled from the 
CIO and hounded by government authorities throughout the 
1950s, Mine-Mill waged a valiant but doomed struggle against 
the forces of capitalist reaction, ultimately merging with 
the United Steelworkers in 1967. That merger signalled the 
end of radical unionism in the nonferrous metals industry 
born seventy-five years earlier.3
Today, the massive smelterworks at McGill sits 
abandoned. A few weeds have grown around its aging walls 
which are surrounded by a chain-link fence warning potential 
trespassers that they are approaching private property. 
Copper production at the site ceased in the early 1980s, and 
some of the district's residents still blame the union for 
Kennecott's departure. The neat company houses are still 
occupied, but the sleepy town displays little of its former 
vibrancy as a thriving smeltertown. The massive slag pit 
spills into the valley to the west like a frozen black
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river, the remnant of eighty years of environmental 
despoliation.
To the south, the great open-pit, which continued 
expanding until the 1960s, is periodically worked by gold- 
mining companies. Its deep holes are filled with greenish- 
yellow water, colored and poisoned by the chemicals used to 
leach the precious metal from the rock. The mining town of 
Ruth, moved several times to make room for the enlarging 
pit, contains several blocks of houses in neat rows. The 
buildings at Kimberly have been bulldozed and its 
underground mines have been caved in to deter intruders.
This site now serves only the interest of archaeologists, 
who scour for artifacts that may give some glimpse into the 
lost lives of early twentieth-century copper miners.
Although the county seat of Ely has survived, the 
barren mines attest to the area's decline as the state's 
leading mineral producer. The rise and fall of the Ely 
district mirrors the common history of many western mining 
towns. Labor and capital struggled early on to construct a 
mutually-agreeable system of industrial relations. At Ely, 
this was first resolved with the informal equilibriums of 
the 1920s. However, resulting contradictions and changing 
external conditions led to the destruction of this system.
In its place, a formal structure emerged that lasted until 
the district's ore finally petered out in the 1980s. Ely 
copperworkers and Mine-Mill organizers played a key role in
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bringing about the new order. Although the Cold War "social 
accord" soon solidified in capital's favor, this was not yet 
determined in 1943, when unionism became entrenched in the 
area. To be sure, once Mine-Mill was established in the 
district, nobody would have seen "such contented workers."
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1. Jack Fleming, "Copper Town King," Nevada Historical 
Society Quarterly 25 (Spring 1982), 39.
2. Elv Record. February 11, 1956, ibid.. February 18, 1956; 
ibid.. April 6, 1957; ibid.. November 2, 1957; Oral 
Interview with Jay Carson by David M. Anderson, July 9, 
1993.
3. For a brief history of Mine-Mill after World War II see 
Solski and Smaller, Mine-Mill (Ottawa, 1985), 16-18.
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